




GREECE

OFFICE



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 630 FIFTH AVENUE
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 NEW YORK 20, N. Y.
 NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

15 December 1944
 15 December 1944

To Major General William J. Donovan
 To Major General William J. Donovan
 From John C. Hughes
 From John C. Hughes
 Subject Report on Greek Situation
 Subject Report on Greek Situation

At my request, Miss Carp of this office has prepared a report on the present Greek situation which I think you will find of interest. I attach herewith the original of this memorandum together with a copy of the covering memorandum from Miss Carp, outlining the contents of the report and setting forth the sources from which she got this information.

The second report referred to in her covering memo will be in final form tomorrow, Saturday, and I will send that down to you as soon as available.

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December 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR JOHN C HUGHES

SUBJECT: GREEK SITUATION

I am enclosing herewith as of possible interest my report dealing with developments of the Greek problem in its various aspects. The report gives a summary review of the activities and aims of the two resistance groups in Greece and deals more specifically with the complications which have brought about the present struggle between the EAM-ELAS on the one hand, and the Papandreou government and the British military forces as well as the London government on the other.

The general outline in the attached memorandum is based on information disclosed by persons with certain EAM sympathies.

In view of the fact that opinions and comments among Greeks who have been interviewed cannot possibly be reconciled and that there exists a very striking difference of conception among them, it has been necessary to submit two separate memoranda which will illustrate to you the conflicting views.

The second report deals with the Greek problem from its early stages to its latest developments as analysed by Mr. P. M., a close collaborator of Mr. S. Venizelos. (See biographical sketch enclosed.) The opinions outlined in his enclosure represent those of Greek citizens who may be identified as members of leading financial and business interests in Greece. Although this category of Greeks are also opposed to the Greek monarchy, and even go as far as sympathising with certain leftist parties in Greece, belonging to the EAM, they are bitterly opposed to the Communistic tendencies of the EAM and to communistic leaders and their activities in general. They do not approve of Great Britain's extreme measures, but are willing to tolerate such measures as long as they may lead to eradicating any extreme program of the EAM which may serve communistic ends.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT GREEK SITUATION

The following is a review of events which have taken place in Greece during the past few weeks and is based on conversations with ranking Greek citizens holding conflicting political views.

During the course of these conversations, it was pointed out that in order to get a fairly clear picture of the latest developments, tracing them back to their origin, consideration must be given to the British policy toward Greece since the fall of Crete and the establishment of the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt.

Following the occupation of Greece by German and Italian invasion troops, British policy governing the Greek problem remained unopposed in view of the fact that the memory of common sacrifice with British troops dominated all other considerations on the part of the Greeks and prompted them to refrain from expressing any criticism against their great ally. On the other hand, the Greek guerrilla organization at that time was in a stage of relative infancy and therefore not properly equipped to enforce the opinions and reactions of the dominated peoples of Greece. However, upon having acquired sufficient physical power and a consciousness of its strength and position, a trend of an ever growing divergence between Greek partisans and the creators of Britain's foreign policy towards Greece became apparent.

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During the early part of this year, on March 10th, a political committee of National Unity was formed in Greece with the object of uniting all political and military national forces and placing them at the disposal of the Allied Armies of Liberation. This committee was headed by Professor Alexander Avlonis, Colonel Bakirtzis, General Mandakas, who had led the guerrillas in Crete, Professor A. Angelopoulos of the University of Athens, Mr. N. Askoutsis, former Cabinet Minister and governor of Crete, Mr. D. Santos, former communist deputy, Mr. Elias Tsirimokos, former deputy of the liberal party, and Mr. K. Gabriellides, former deputy of the Agrarian Party. The Committee became known as the "Political Committee of National Liberation", and was appointed by the EAM for the purpose of establishing a government of national unity.

The above committee then called upon the Greek Government in Exile in Cairo which was presided by Mr. Tsouderos, but the latter refused to enter into negotiations with its delegates who had come all the way from Greece for this very purpose. This attitude brought about an open mutiny on the part of the Greek army and navy stationed in the Near East. As a matter of fact, on March 31, 1944, a delegation composed of officers of the Greek fighting forces called upon Mr. Tsouderos demanding the opening of a national conference for the establishment of a government of national unity wherein all national forces would be duly represented.

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In connection with the above developments, it must be pointed out that the EAM followers had never recognized the Greek government in exile as a Constitutional Government inasmuch as the King of Greece had abolished the Constitution in 1936 and established the dictatorship under Metaxas. Our Greek advisors further explained that whereas Tsouderos had taken into account a year earlier the demands which had been submitted by a similar delegation of officers to eliminate certain Fascist elements from the armed forces, he now refused to give a hearing to the above mentioned delegation and ordered the arrest of the officers. This action is reported to have marked the signal for a widespread mutiny among the armed forces, the troops remaining in their barracks and refusing to obey government orders. Simultaneously, Greek crews remained on their ships waiting for the compliance of the Greek Government in Exile with the demands of the officer delegates.

Coincident with these events, the Committee of National Unity Greek Armed Forces Middle East submitted a petition to the Prime Minister of Great Britain on April 15th, 1944, outlining its grievances and soliciting consideration of its demands. A copy of the above petition is attached herewith and may be found of interest particularly in view of the fact that many of the critical events and complications which have now developed were anticipated in this petition and were never given any publicity in the press.

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In view of the persistent revolutionary attitude of the Committee of National Unity, Mr. Tsouderos finally had recourse to the British to crush what he considered an open rebellion and the conflict of the opposing armed forces resulted in casualties on both sides. The rebellious troops were eventually arrested, and placed in concentration camps from which they were released only a short while ago.

The foregoing events created far reaching reactions among Greeks both at home and abroad and Tsouderos was forced to resign. He was succeeded by Sophocles Venizelos whose government lasted a few days only and finally the Greek Cabinet in exile was placed under the Premiership of Mr. George Papandreou, who has remained the head of the government to the present day.

Immediately upon the formation of the Papandreou government, the Lebanon conference was arranged at which all political parties and fighting forces were represented, a national charter then being adopted, proclaiming "national unity" and thus meeting the demands of the "mutineers".

In spite of the above temporary solution of the acute problem, relations between the EAM and the British did not sustain any improvement. The EAM continued suspecting the British of contemplating the return of the King of Greece to his homeland, whereas the British suspected EAM of planning to seize power in Greece once the country had been liberated. At the same time,

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the King of Greece was reluctant to give assurances that he would not return to Greece unless called upon to do so following the results of a free plebiscite.

At this point it may not be amiss to submit summary information on the organization of the two opposing Greek parties, the character of their leaders and their political aims.

EAM (Greek Liberation Front). The EAM with its fighting forces the ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army) represents the outstanding resistance group in Greece. Anthony Eden is reported to have admitted in the House of Commons on April 5, 1944, that the EAM comprises 75 percent of all guerrilla and underground forces operating in Greece.

The EAM is a representative body of the Socialist, the Agrarian, the Communist, the Peasants, the Workers and some other minor parties with left wing tendencies. The EAM was also joined by the Civil Servants Union, the Railway Brotherhood and the General Unionist Confederation of Labor. Thus, the EAM obviously represents the popular movement, its members belonging to the middle and lower social ranks, and including many students, intellectuals and even priests. In its general character the EAM bears much resemblance to the Spanish Popular Front of 1936.

The outstanding leaders of the EAM are Alexander Svolos, Professor of Constitutional law of the University of Athens, Professor Angelopoulos of the same university, Mr. Elias Tairimokos,

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a member of the Liberal party and the Communist Mr. Santos. The Bishop of Kosani is its spiritual leader and General Kmanuel Sarafis, considered to be an able career officer, who was at one time chief of staff of the Greek army, commands the ELAS, viz. the EAM's fighting forces.

EDES. (Greek Democratic National Army). The EDES has been described as a nationalistic fighting organisation composed primarily of rightist liberals and some royalists. Col. Napoleon Zervas, who is also a career officer, heads the EDES. This group has a very small membership but is reported to be better organized than the EAM, its men consisting mostly of regular soldiers under the command of experienced officers.

Our informants report that the EAM with its much larger force and its greater aggressiveness, had spread over the major portion of Greece and displayed a much greater activity against the Germans during the Axis occupation than the EDES whose activities were confined to a small area in Northwestern Greece. The aims and political objectives of the two Greek resistance groups may be defined as follows:

The EDES group is known to favor English intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, being apprehensive of the aims of their rivals, the EAM-ELAS group. It has been stressed that the EDES are not positively more pro-British than their rivals, but they are prompted by a conviction that only England can forestall

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a leftist government in Greece. On the other hand, the EDES are openly anti-Russian and anti-Communist and very much afraid of the growing power of their Slav neighbors in the North.

EAM's officially proclaimed program gives the following objectives:

- 1). The liberation of Greece from its invaders.
- 2). Elimination of all foreign rule and influence and complete independence of the country.
- 3). The formation of a provisional coalition government composed of all anti-fascist elements, following the liberation of the country, such a government to re-instate immediately democratic liberties, to provide work and food for everybody with the assistance of the Allies and to ensure territorial integrity of the country. It is furthermore planned to continue the fight against the Axis and to prepare the ground for free elections. Finally, the EAM contemplates introducing fundamental social and economic reforms and to abolish the institution of the monarchy. However they propose the abolishment of the monarchy by means of a popular plebiscite.

The present serious armed conflict between the forces of the EAM and the Papandreu government and the British forces is reported to have been brought about as a direct consequence of the British demand, through Mr. Papandreu, that all Greek guerrilla troops should be disarmed and a new national army organized. EAM leaders are stated to have announced their willingness to disband

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their forces on condition that the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion should comply with the same requirements. EAM members admit that the Mountain Brigade fought bravely in Italy and the Sacred Battalion in El Alamein and in the Libyan campaign, but they claim that following the mutiny in Egypt both of the foregoing units were reorganised and placed under the command of officers with royalist sympathies. The EAM also insists upon the disbanding of the Greek Gendarmerie and the members of the Athens police who, they state, served under the Quisling government during the German occupation. Finally EAM also demands a speedy trial of the principal collaborators and the organisation of a plebiscite to decide on the question of the monarchy. EAM is very much embittered against Churchill and formally denies the charges made last week by the British Prime Minister in Parliament that they were preparing a coup d'état. They explain that if such had been their intention they could have taken advantage of a more propitious moment, at the time the Germans were withdrawing from Greece and prior to the landing of British forces.

In conclusion, the consensus of opinion among Greeks is that regardless of who may succeed the present Papandreu government, there is no chance of the king's return. Monarchy for Greece may definitely be considered as a thing of the past and the Greeks feel confident that a plebiscite will bear out their above contention.

Translation
from Greek.

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Letter addressed by the Committee of National Unity
of the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East
to the Prime Minister of Great Britain
on April 15, 1944.

Dear Mr. Churchill:

Confident that we express the opinion and feelings of the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East, we address to you this open letter to bring to your notice and to the notice of the whole British nation, the present situation which at any moment may result in incidents which will poison irreparably the relations between our two Allied Armies. We are making this appeal to you, and through you to the Nation which you lead, because we would like to believe that you are not fully aware of the measures which the representatives of the British government have taken to meet this situation.

Invariably in your speeches, and especially recently, you have expressed your sorrow at the divisions that exist among the Greeks. We are sure that the sorrow you have expressed implies an ardent desire to see Greece united and to see it become, through this unity, strong and happy. With all respect, we cannot agree with the importance you have attached to certain incidents, on the basis of which you have characterized the Greek situation as chaotic and deplorable. In contrast to your views, certain high personalities among the United Nations have expressed their admiration at the unity of the Greek Nation and have given correct explanations of these incidents. Since we cannot but judge the leaders of the world anti-fascist struggle by the same standards and since we cannot attribute to them divergent feelings towards our Nation, leading in consequence to divergent conclusions, we consider it our duty to bring to your personal notice the facts concerning the present situation, so that, being aware of this, you may arrive at the same correct conclusions about the Greek problem as the other well informed circles among the Allied Nations.

The Greek Nation was, is and always will be united. Those minor incidents which, we believe, through your lack of information, have driven you to wrong conclusions, were not expressions of dissension among our people; on the contrary, they were simply expressions of national unity, which at every turn neutralized the attempts of those who were trying to disrupt that unity. Recently these attempts at disruption, which have even descended to collaboration with the enemy, have originated directly from those who surround King George II. We do not wish to mention particular incidents since we know that documentary evidence exists in your various departments which confirm the statement we have made. Perhaps because of your close friendship with King George our statement may arouse a certain bitterness on your part against us, but we still believe that a fact, whatever personal feelings it may call up, does not, because of this, cease to

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retain its validity in the realm of reality. The actions of King George, which we have mentioned, can be fully explained if they are examined in the light of the policy he followed during the dark period which began on August 4th, 1936. The measures then taken carry the indelible seal of royal responsibility. During that period the policy that King George followed was that of a petty autocrat who appointed the most discredited and disreputable elements in Greece to positions of responsibility, and today, it cannot be denied that the closest friends of the King and the executive heads of that period now constitute the Quisling group in Greece. Just as King George selected his advisers and the executives of his will on his arrival in our country in 1936, so today he is trying once again, using the same elements, to impose violently and irresponsibly the same fascist regime, of which he is the creator, on the long-suffering Greek people. While the betrayed Greek people would have been perfectly justified in settling first of all their account with King George and his clique, they have decided to leave this question for the future on the condition that the King declare that he will not return to Greece until he is invited by a free plebiscite of the Greek people. On this particular point, as you are aware, complete agreement exists among the Greek parties.

This declaration which the whole nation demands from the King is justified by the general mistrust in which he is regarded. This mistrust arises from:

- a) the arbitrary decision of the monarchicel clique taken on October 10, 1935 for the restoration of the monarchy.
- b) the faked plebiscite of Metaxas in April 1936.
- c) the appointment of Metaxas in April 1936.
- d) the imposition of fascism on August 4th, 1936, which crowned the three previous measures of a clique of the King's personal friends.

In order to prevent a repetition of such arbitrary measures, the nation is obliged to demand the afore-mentioned declaration and the King must agree to sign it if he wishes to prove that he was sincere when he promised to respect the sovereign will of the people. Even if this popular demand touches the personal pride of the King, it cannot be maintained that the dignity of one person is superior to that of a whole people which he betrayed on August 4th, 1936.

This, in brief, is the general outline of the Greek problem. It remains now to examine how this has created the present state of affairs in the Middle East. It was only natural that the stand taken by the King, and the decision taken by the people not to accept any compromise, should have created around the King groups of vacillating politicians whose popularity varied with the strength of the popular anti-monarchic feeling and whose main objective in Cairo was to retain office at any price. As such, these groups

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were nothing but an obstacle to the creation of a real government of national coalition.

With the approach of national liberation, fighting Greece, under the leadership of the National Liberation Front (E.A.M.) had no recourse but to set up the Political Committee of National Liberation which appealed to all the truly patriotic elements in the Nation with a view to forming a national government. The adventurers around the King refused to collaborate; instead, by a policy of wait and see, they tried to extract from this situation as much profit for themselves as they could. Confronted with these criminal delaying tactics, the Armed Forces in the Middle East expressed, by their magnificent action, their desire for national unity, thus depriving the handful of disrupters in Cairo of all further pretense that national unity had not yet been achieved. The importance of and the determination behind the decision taken by the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East, demonstrates both the real democratic feeling of our people and the strength of the present national unity, a unity which cannot be undermined and broken either by distance or by the calumnies of disrupters. In the face of this great national achievement of ours, your representative in the Middle East together with British Armed Forces are besieging the heroes of Albania, and today, Easter Sunday, is the 15th day since the Greek Armed Forces have had their food and water supplies cut off.

The Greeks, because of their friendship with the British Nation, are patiently enduring this situation, the like of which has never been heard of before in the history of Allied Nations. We must, however, warn you that if these inhuman measures continue, there is a real danger of a serious clash between besieged and besiegers. These measures, which are only paralleled by Hitler's treatment of his allies, are leading to a rapid deterioration in the relationship between two traditionally friendly armies.

We would like to believe that your personal interest in the strengthening of friendly relations between allies, will put an end to these inhuman measures, which only encourage the small clique of Greek disrupters, and prevent the completion of our existing national unity, for which you have so often appealed to the Greek people.

With profound respect

"THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY
GREEK ARMED FORCES, MIDDLE EAST."

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Born in Larissa, Greece, in 1890. He studied in the Military Academy at Athens and participated in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the World War and the Asia Minor campaign (1919-1922). He resigned from the Army in 1927 with the rank of major of artillery. During the political crisis between King Constantine and Venizelos (1917), he supported the latter and is known to have been one of his intimate collaborators. After retiring from the Army, he engaged in newspaper work and wrote for various Athenian papers, and for some time he published his own paper, which was financed by the wealthy Greek industrialist, Mr. Bodosakis Athanasiades. He has always been active in politics, and in 1942 he came to the United States from Egypt after the British authorities there asked him to leave the country, because of his violent campaign against the Greek king. In the United States he has published for the past 18 months a weekly, the "Eleftheros Typos" (Free Press). He may be called a conservative democrat and a strong anti-monarchist. At the same time he is an outspoken Russophobe and the dominant feature of his paper is his violent attacks on Pan Slavism and Communism. He has always opposed and fought the leftist EAM-ELAS group and in the present crisis in Greece he is an all-out supporter of the Papandreu government and the British authorities in Athens.

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.**

18 December 1944

To Major General William J. Donovan
From Esther M. Tyler
Subject Report on Greek Situation

Mr Hughes is in Washington today so in his
absence I am sending you herewith original of the
second report on the Greek situation mentioned in
his memorandum to you of 15 December.

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Avant de commencer le present rapport sur la situation Grecque, je tiens a declarer que je suis un Liberal Avance, par conviction anti-communiste, et de tout temps oppose aux principes monarchiques. Etant donne les antecedents historiques et les caracteristiques nationaux du peuple Grec, je considere que le regime tout indique pour mon pays, c'est un regime de republique democratiques, copie sur la Constitution si heureusement adoptee aux Etats Unis d'Amerique.

La situation actuelle en Grece peut etre analysee aussi brievement que possible de la maniere suivante:

Pendant la dictature royale, sous le General Metaxas, installee le 4 aout 1936, le parti communiste n'a fait aucune tentative de resistance, non seulement parce que beaucoup de ses affiliates avaient ete poursuivis par la dictature, mais parce que le parti communiste lui-meme dans un certain sens considerait la dictature utile a ses fins ulterieures; parce que les dirigeants communistes croyait qu'un jour viendrait ou la dictature serait renversee par la force, et alors ce ne serait pas les partis politiques qui pourraient assumer le pouvoir, parce que ces partis, etant particulierement atrocement poursuivis par la dictature, seraient desagreges, et les communistes, toujours mieux resistants parce que plus disciplines, fanatiques et opiniatres, seraient tout indiques pour remplir le vide politique que la desagregation des partis d'ordre ne manquerait pas de creer.

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Pendant l'aggression de l'Italie, le parti communiste de Grece, suivant la ligne politique generale dictée par la Troisième Internationale de Moscou aux partis communistes de tous les pays d'Europe, se declara contre l'idee de la resistance. Seule la dictature de Metaxas est arrivee a cacher cette attitude du parti communiste dans la Grece meme, parce que par les soins du Ministre de Police de Grece d'alors, Maniatakis, une proclamation recommandant aux communistes Grecs de s'unir a la nation contre l'envahisseur Italien a ete publiee sous la signature du Secetaire General du parti communiste d'alors, Zachariadis, qui se trouvait alors en prison. Par suite de la censure dictatoriale il n'a pas ete possible de decouvrir ce faux officiel que beaucoup de mois apres. A l'etranger, pourtant, les communistes grecs qui se trouvaient ici, et plus particulierement les marins de la marine marchande grecque, obeissant aux directives du parti, ont fait tout ce qu'ils ont pu pour saboter l'effort de guerre de la Grece. Notamment, il faut citer le fait concret des trois bateaux portant des munitions en Grece. Les bateaux Neli Kulkundis, George Nikolau et George Kapalikos, par des obstructions systematiques de leurs equipages, ont ete retards respectivement de 24 jours, de 17 jours et de 56 jours. Le Consulat de Grece ici a New York a meme ete oblige de demander l'intervention coercitive des autorites americaines. (Immigration Service)

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La Resistance en Grece:

Après l'invasion de la Grece par les Allemands et la conquête de la Grece, l'attitude communiste a change. Le 21 juin 1941, quand les Allemands ont attaque la Russie, les communistes partout, et par consequent ceux de la Grece aussi, ont resolu de s'unir a leurs nations respectives pour la resistance contre l'envahisseur. En Grece, dix jours avant l'arrivee des Allemands a Athenes, quelques liberaux, parmi lesquels certains officiers, ont pris la resolution d'essayer d'organiser dans le pays une espee de Ligue qui commencerait d'abord par tacher de soutenir le morale du peuple contre les envahisseurs, et d'organiser, si possible plus tard, la resistance passive et active au fur et a mesure de l'evolution generale de la guerre. C'est cette organisation la qui a ete le premier noyau de l'actuel EAM (Front National de Liberation). Les communistes, quelques mois plus tard, ont offert de s'unir a cette organisation, qui devait absorber d'autres organisations locales analogues creees dans l'interval, et se developper en un front de toute la nation resistant a l'ennemi. Cette organisation a ete creee avec le soutien des chefs de partis politiques organises mais qui, etant donne qu'ils etaient particulierement sous la surveillance italienne et allemande, ne pouvaient pas prendre directement la direction du mouvement. C'est alors que cette direction a ete assumee par le parti communiste, pour les raisons suivantes:

1. Le parti communiste, comme il est bien connu, est par essence conspirateur, habitue et amene a travailler contre l'autorite etablie par des moyens illegaux et disposant d'agents speciallement instruits

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pour cette espee d'action. Le secretaire general actuel du parti communiste en Grece, M. Saintos, a ete instruit pendant huit ans a la guerre civile et a l'action revolutionnaire dans une des ecoles speciales existant dans ce but a Moscou.

2. Le parti communiste serait plus a meme, par ses slogans et principes habituels, de fomenter des greves, sous le pretexte apparent de demande d'augmentation de salaires, amelioration des conditions de travail, distribution des vivres, d'autant que la Grece alors passait par l'epreuve atroce de la famine et des milliers de personnes par mois mourraient de faim, surtout dans les grandes villes, ce qui etait un facteur decisivemnt favorable pour l'excitation des masses au sabotage, a la greve et aux demonstrations. Cette maniere de resistance etait alors reellement la seule indiquee et possible pour habituer la nation a l'idee de la resistance. Devant l'envahisseur ces actions populaires se presentaient comme inspirees non par des motifs et des idees de resistance a la domination, mais par la faim et par la souffrance physique. Les communistes en ont profite pour activer en meme temps leur propagande politique particuliere et recruter ainsi des partisans, d'autant plus que la resistance victorieuse de la Russie disposait les peuples a l'admiration et a la gratitude envers la grande allee sovietique et par contre coup a ses fideles de tout temps, les communistes.

Le Gouvernement Grec en Exil:

Entretiens, le gouvernement grec en exil, preside par M. Tsouderos, n'avait absolument rien fait, ni pour aider, ni pour organiser et surveiller ce mouvement. Tout au contraire, il a quitte l'Egypte

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pour se rendre a Londres, et a presque donne l'impression de se des-interesser aux souffrances du pays sous l'occupation. De plus, ce qui etait pire, par ses actes et certaines mesures, il a donne nettement l'impression que le Roi comptait de toute facon continuer sa dictature sous une forme larvee. Ceci accentua et exaspera en Grece le sentiment populaire nettement anti-royaliste, non seulement parce que le peuple dans la majorite etait republicain, mais parce que meme le parti royaliste s'est depuis longtemps dresse contre le Roi parce que celui-ci, violant son serment de fidelite constitutionnelle, avait viole la Constitution, renvoye le Parlement, impose la dictature et persecute l'opposition. Dans ces conditions, les communistes ont eu l'occasion particulierement favorable a leur dessein, d'exploiter ce sentiment populaire anti-royaliste, en se proclamant contre le Roi et son gouvernement, d'une maniere beaucoup plus nette que les autres partis politiques pouvaient le faire, ces derniers etant bien obliges de penser aux difficultes generales qui seraient crees par les exigences d'un changement de regime en pleine guerre sans aucune manifestation reguliere populaire prealable.

La Premiere Intervention Russe

C'est exactement a cette epoque, et notamment au commencement de 1942, que le gouvernement grec en exil a cru devoir signer, sous les auspices du Foreign Office, un traite d'alliance d'apres-guerre avec le gouvernement yougoslave en exil, lui aussi a Londres. Cette combinaison diplomatique a ete vue d'un oeil absolument hostile a Moscou, qui n'avait pas manque de declarer nettement que toute alliance

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on federation peripherique etait considerée comme se rattachant d'une maniere ou d'une autre a l'idee absolument inacceptable par la Russie, du cordon sanitaire. Vraisemblablement par hasard, c'est exactement alors que se manifesta en Yougoslavie le mouvement partisan sous Tito, et en Grece la creation par l'EAM, tombe dans l'entretemps sous la domination absolue du parti communiste, de l'armee de resistance connu sous le nom d'ELAS (Armee Populaire Liberatrice). Mais tandis que l'EAM etait composee dans la proportion de 80% d'elements liberaux, socialistes et paysans, plus ou moins avances, mais en tout cas non-communistes, la direction communiste de l'organisation a pris soin que son organe militaire, l'ELAS, soit compose de 80% de communistes convaincus et affilies au parti.

Pour cacher la veritable nature communiste de cette armee, le parti communiste a pris soin de mettre a la tete de cette armee le Colonel Sarafis (Stefan), liberal, anti-royaliste, persecute par la dictature de Metaxas, et notoirement non-communiste. Je ne peux pas dire d'une maniere responsable comment il ete possible de persuader Sarafis de prendre le commandement d'une armee dont il ne pouvait ignorer la composition communiste. On dit, mais je ne garde bien de l'avouer, qu'il a ete force d'accepter, sous la menace qu'en cas de refus sa famille a Trikala, Thessalie, aurait a en souffrir les consequences. De toute facon, le cadre de cette armee ELAS a ete compose d'elements communistes avec une participation absolument minime des officiers de l'armee reguliere ayant combattu contre les Italiens et les Allemands. Deux autres officiers superieurs seulement ont accepte

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de s'affilier a l'ELAS: le Colonel Bakirdzis et le General de Brigade Mandakas. Le premier avait de tout temps des tendances communistes. A une certaine epoque, il ecrivait des articles pour l'organe officiel du parti communiste sous le pseudonyme de Colonel Rouge. La dictature, prenant comme pretexte cette tendance, avait persecute le Colonel, l'avait traduit devant le Conseil de Discipline que l'avait raye du cadre de l'armee de reserve, et l'avait finalement exile dans une ile d'ou, en 1938, elle lui permit de se rendre en Roumanie. Le Colonel Bakirdzis resta en Roumanie jusqu'a l'aggression italienne contre la Grece, et c'est alors qu'il lui fut permis de rentrer au pays, mais il a ete toujours sous la surveillance de la Police Secrete, parce qu'on savait que ses affiliations avec les communistes s'etaient renforcees pendant, et a cause, de ses persecutions.

En ce qui concerne le General Mandakas, ancien liberal du parti de Venizelos, l'invasion allemande le trouvait en Crete, ou il est nee. Il etait hors de l'armee parce qu'il avait pris part a une tentative de revolution contre la dictature, ayant eu lieu en Crete en 1938. Quand le gouvernement de Grece, fuyant devant les Allemands, est venu d'Athenes en Crete, le President du Conseil des Ministres d'alors, Tsouderos, invita le General Mandakas a reprendre du service actif dans l'armee et a prendre part a la defense de l'ile. Le General mit comme condition prealable, la proclamation par le gouvernement d'un programme nettement communiste, et comme le President du Conseil refusa, Mandakas lui aussi crut pouvoir refuser de servir son pays, meme pour

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la defense de son ile natale. Apres la conquete de la Grece, pourtant, etant donne qu'un mois exactement apres cette conquete les Allemands ont attaque la Russie, Mandakas, qui s'etait retire dans les montagnes, a constitue autour de lui le premier noyau de la resistance forcee opposee par les Grecs contre l'envahisseur.

La Liaison avec le Quartier General du Moyen Orient:

Les groupes de resistance formes en Grece, comme je viens de l'exposer, tout naturellement se sont mis en contact, autant que les circonstances le permettaient, avec les autorites politiques et militaires britanniques du Caire. Les Anglais avaient constitue au Caire une espee d'organisation intitulee "Greek Section of the British Embassy", sous la direction d'un agent diplomatique nomme Sebastian, et assiste par M. Thomas Bowman, ancien Vice-Consul Britannique d'Athenes. Cette organisation, rattachee a l'Ambassade Britannique aupres du gouvernement Egyptien au Caire, s'occupait specialement des affaires Grecques, vu que l'Ambassadeur Britannique aupres du Gouvernement Grec se trouvait a Londres, siege provisoire du Gouvernement Grec en Exil. Aussi, c'est cette organisation politique-diplomatique qui assura la liaison avec la Grece. Mais, en meme temps, le Grand Quartier General aussi avait ses services particuliers pour cette affaire, diriges, si je ne me trompe, par un Colonel Monsul. Comme il est bien naturel quand plusieurs organisations de service s'occupent separement d'affaires relatives a un meme sujet, des confusions, des malentendus, des divergences de vues sont inevitables. C'est ce qui arriva dans le cas dont il s'agit.

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Les officiers britanniques envoyés comme liaison, ne pouvaient se faire une image complète de la situation générale. Chacun voyait un secteur et certaines personnes, et naturellement se formait une opinion fragmentée et pas toujours exacte. C'étaient ces opinions qui faisaient l'objet de divers rapports sur lesquels les autorités britanniques sur place basaient les suggestions faites à Londres.

D'autre part, il y avait l'erreur fondamentale commise par le gouvernement britannique, et ayant trait à la décision de soutenir coûte que coûte le Roi et le gouvernement de Tsouderos. Pour cette erreur je ne crois qu'il peut y avoir une justification sérieuse. En effet:

1. Le gouvernement britannique savait parfaitement, dès le premier moment de l'arrivée du Roi et de son gouvernement en Grèce, que l'opinion était absolument contre lui. Effectivement, le gouvernement, arrivant en Grèce, se trouva devant un Comité Populaire formé des anciens députés Venizelistes, Nikolas Ascouthis and Georgiadakis, et plusieurs d'autres, qui demanda à M. Tsouderos la proclamation annulant la dictature, proclamant nul et non avenu le décret royal dictatorial du 4 août, renvoyant sine die le Parlement et les Ministres dictatoriaux faisant partie du Cabinet Tsouderos. Le gouvernement Tsouderos refusa nettement de satisfaire à cette demande, ce qui eut pour résultat d'exaspérer la population à tel point qu'une émeute eut lieu à Castella et la populace, perdant tout contrôle, massacra odieusement le Général Papastergios, grand ami de la dictature. Même le Ministre de Police de Metaxas, Maniadhakis, aurait été tué par

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la populace si le sous-signe n'avait pu intervenir a temps et exhorter les meneurs a ne rien faire qui put porter prejudice a l'organisation de la defense de l'ile contre une attaque allemande, jugee alors, a juste raison, comme imminente.

A cette occasion, je crois devoir devoiler que les autorites britanniques ont envoye le Consul de Cannel, Mr. Hill, et le Vice-Consul d'Athenes, Mr. Bowman, qui ont eu une rencontre avec les representants du Comite Populaire, auquel ils ont communique une espee de note verbale, specifiant notamment que dans le cas ou toute opposition au gouvernement ne cesserait pas immediatement, les autorites britanniques se trouveraient peut-etre dans l'obligation d'evacuer leurs troupes et de laisser la responsabilite de la defense de l'ile a la population. En revanche, ils declaraient qu'ils prenaient la responsabilite de veiller a ce que le Roi et son gouvernement donneraient satisfaction a tous les desirats politiques ci-dessus mentionnes et que le Comite Populaire demandait a M. Tsouderos.

Je connais l'affaire en detail, et je prends la responsabilite absolue a ce qui concerne l'exactitude de tous ce que je raconte, parce que pendant la demarche des Consuls britanniques, j'etais present, en ayant ete pris par le Comite Populaire, et meme c'est moi qui ai servi a ces Messieurs comme interprete pendant leurs conversations avec les autorites britanniques. Sur mon conseil, le Comite Populaire accepta de se dissoudre et, en donnant satisfaction a la demande des anglais, obtint de la population de rester tranquille, ce qui fut fait.

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Malheureusement, les autorites britanniques ont cru indigne de ne pas tenir leurs promesses. Ainsi, une fois la Grece evacuee, l'histoire recommenca en Egypte, avec le resultat que M. Tsouderos fut oblige de se debarrasser des Ministres de la Police et de la Propagande, M. Maniatakis et M. Nicoloudis, en envoyant le premier en mission speciale en Argentine et en creant pour le second une nouvelle Ambassade Grecque aupres du Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud. La solution, naturellement, ne donna pas satisfaction aux Grecs d'Egypte qui, par ailleurs, forment une colonie assez nombreuse, etablie sous le regime special existant en Egypte sous le systeme des capitulations.

2. Le Gouvernement Grec quittait l'Egypte pour Londres vers le commencement de juillet 1941, laissant derriere lui cette situation grosse de toute espee de dangers et de troubles, lesquels, naturellement, n'ont pas tarde de se developper. Dans l'entretemps, les chefs des partis politiques de Grece, M. Sofoulis et M. Gonatas, ont trouve le moyen de communiquer aux autorites anglaises, par deux officiers envoyes d'Athenes specialement pour cette raison, un proces-verbal redige par les chefs de tous les partis politiques de Grece, rassembles en seance secrete. Par ce communique, les autorites britanniques ont ete informees que tous les chefs des partis politiques de Grece estimaient necessaire la reforme du Cabinet, l'abolition formelle et definitive de la dictature royale, c'est a dire, en somme, les mesures que le Comite Populaire de Grece avait deja demande.

M. Tsouderos, etant a Londres, a cru pouvoir tout arranger par un discours radio-diffuse dans lequel il proclamait ses

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convictions democratiques. Ce discours n'a pas du tout satisfait l'opinion, laquelle a fait savoir ses sentiments aux autorités britanniques par l'intermédiaire de la "Greek Section of the British Embassy in Cairo" dont j'ai déjà parlé. Comme résultat, M. Anthony Eden a télégraphié à cette même Section, de demander spécifiquement l'opinion de M. George Roussos, l'avocat bien connu d'Alexandrie, ami très intime du feu M. Eleftherios Venizelos, Président de la communauté grecque d'Alexandrie et surtout du Comité National Grec d'Egypte. M. Roussos a répondu par un télégramme dans laquelle il adoptait point par point toutes les revendications de l'opinion, comme je viens de les exposer. Malgré tout, le gouvernement grec a persisté dans son intransigeance, et tout naturellement, l'opinion forma la conviction que cette attitude du gouvernement grec en exil devenait possible seulement parce que les autorités britanniques voulaient absolument imposer le Roi.

A cette époque, et notamment au mois d'octobre 1941, j'ai envoyé moi-même un mémoire à M. Tsouderos et un autre au Roi, en leur exposant franchement le danger général que leur attitude comportait, et en les exhortant à penser plutôt aux intérêts de la nation qu'à autre chose. Presqu'en même temps, mais sans absolument aucune communication avec eux, le Député d'Alexandrie, Vamvetsos, réfugié en Egypte, adressa un exposé sur la situation grecque à l'Ambassade Britannique, et en même temps il crut, indiqué de soumettre copie de son exposé à M. Kirk, alors Ambassadeur auprès du gouvernement du Caire des Etats Unis d'Amerique. Le résultat en a été l'exil immédiat de M. Vamvetsos et de moi-même aux Indes, en nous ayant été escortés par les autorités

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britanniques, laissés libres à Bombay, mais sous la surveillance la plus étroite de la police. En passant, je dois peut-être dire, que c'est de là que j'ai pu m'évader sur un bateau marchand, battant pavillon Panamien, et risquant tout pour retrouver ma liberté, j'ai pu, après huit mois de voyage, arriver à New York, où j'ai trouvé l'hospitalité et le refuge de tradition de ce grand, noble, libre et réellement démocratique pays.

4. Le soutien partisan et obstiné des Anglais au gouvernement Tsouderos et au Roi, contre la volonté de la nation grecque, a continué. Ainsi, une première mutinerie dans certains bâtiments de guerre de Grèce a éclaté à Alexandrie avec, comme résultat, l'arrivée de Londres en Egypte du Roi et de M. Tsouderos, et une réforme partielle du Cabinet, dans laquelle M. Canellopoulos, jeune professeur et politicien récemment évadé de Grèce, a été nommé Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres. Naturellement, tant que la dictature royale, quoique larvée, continuait d'exister en réalité, la nomination de M. Canellopoulos ne remédiait à rien, et au mois de mars une nouvelle mutinerie, cette fois-ci dans l'armée grecque organisée en Palestine, se déclancha. Cette fois-ci, M. Tsouderos et le Roi retourneront encore de Londres, mais sur le conseil du gouvernement britannique prirent la décision de s'installer définitivement en Egypte. Et une nouvelle réforme du Cabinet eut lieu avec la ^{coopération} des Ministres représentant le parti libéral démocratique (connu sous le nom de Parti Venizeliste, du nom de son fondateur, feu M. Eleutherios Venizelos). Je crois que l'appel des Venizelistes dans le gouvernement par M. Tsouderos a été

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le resultat de certaines demarches faites par M. Sophocle Veniseles, le seul fils survivant du feu Eleftherius Veniseles.

Quand l'invasion de Grece par les Allemands se produisit, M. Sophocle Veniseles se trouvait ici, ou il s'etait refuge de France, vu qu'il ne pouvait pas rentrer en Grece parce que la dictature du Roi le jugeait indésirable a cause de son hostilité envers la dictature. De Grece, M. Tsouderos pria M. Veniseles, colonel de reserve dans l'armee grecque, d'accepter la nomination au poste d'Attache Militaire aupres de l'Ambassade de Grece a Washington. M. Sophocle Veniseles a juge de son devoir d'accepter ce poste, mais a la condition expresse qu'il serait appele en Egypte le plus tot possible, si non pour autre raison, du moins pour servir la cause commune dans l'armee grecque qui devrait etre formee en Egypte. Quoique M. Tsouderos ait accepte cette condition, il n'a pas pu, parait-il, la realiser. Aussi, quelques mois apres, M. Sophocle Veniseles a donne sa demission et il a continue de rester ici comme refuge. Naturellement, quand le Roi, accompagne de M. Tsouderos, a visite les Etats Unis, M. Veniseles a eu l'occasion de les voir tous les deux, et je crois pouvoir affirmer qu'il n'a pas manque de leur exprimer son point de vue relativement a la politique qu'ils devraient enfin se decider a adopter.

Vers le mois de septembre 1942, M. Tsouderos a adresse au Foreign Office de Londres un memoire dans laquelle il exprimait sa position par rapport a la question constitutionnelle de Grece et de sa politique generale, et il priait le Foreign Office de faire transmettre ces documents a M. Sophocle Veniseles avec, en meme temps, si possible,

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l'opinion du Foreign Office Anglais sur la question. Ces documents ont été effectivement transmis par le Foreign Office à M. Venizelos par une lettre signée de Son Excellence M. Halifax, Ambassadeur du Royaume Uni auprès du gouvernement des Etats Unis à Washington. Je suis en mesure de savoir que M. Venizelos, par ce même canal, de l'Ambassade Britannique de Washington, a répondu en envoyant au Foreign Office deux documents:

- a) Un exposé de la question constitutionnelle dans lequel il réfutait les arguments de M. Tsouderos;
- b) Un mémoire en réponse au draft de l'opinion du Foreign Office sur la question grecque qui accompagnait le mémoire de M. Tsouderos. Dans ce dernier mémoire, je sais que M. Venizelos écrivait notamment que jamais le peuple grec ne n'accepterait le retour du Roi George sans un plebiscite préalable absolument libre, et que la tendance britannique nettement discernable d'exercer, d'une manière ou d'une autre, une pression quelconque en faveur du Roi, ne pouvait être tolérée. Lui-même, le cas échéant, ne pouvait pas manquer au devoir de se mettre, si la nécessité l'y forçait, en tête du parti libéral pour s'opposer par tous les moyens nécessaires à l'exercice d'une pareille pression sur le peuple grec en faveur du Roi.

La même attitude était tenue en Egypte par les autres libéraux qui s'y trouvaient, notamment par M. Rousses, déjà cité, et par M. Karapmajetis.

Je crois pouvoir risquer l'opinion, que c'est à cause de cette attitude et des démarches des libéraux, qu'au mois de mars 1943, M.

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Tsouderos en Egypte se crut forcé de demander le concours des libéraux, et il a donné le portefeuille de la Vice-Présidence à M. Roussos, de Ministre de la Marine à M. Venizelos, rappelle de New York, et de Ministre de la Guerre à M. Carapanayotis.

La Situation en Grèce:

Dans l'intervalle, après l'hiver terrible de 1941/42 en Grèce, pendant lequel la famine a décimé la population, le mouvement de résistance, sous l'inspiration communiste, a commencé à prendre la forme d'un mouvement destiné à combiner en même temps la résistance à l'ennemi et, sous la couvert de celle-ci, la préparation de la domination politique du parti communiste en Grèce. C'est à partir de ce moment, et pour cette raison, que les premières dissidences ont été manifestées en Grèce parmi, d'une part l'organisation EAM, et d'autre part les autres organisations de résistance qui, par la nécessité des choses, se sont formées localement.

Ainsi, il y eut l'organisation EKA, l'organisation EDES, l'organisation EAM. La première, sous le commandement du Colonel d'Artillerie Dimitrios Psaros, était une petite organisation composée de soldats ayant combattu sur le front d'Albanie avec, comme cadres, des officiers de l'armée, de tendances républicaines mais surtout conservatrices. Il paraît que sa force n'a jamais dépassé 2,000 hommes.

L'organisation EDES se forma en Epire sous le commandement du Colonel d'Infanterie en retraite, Napoleon Kervas. Elle a été recrutée exclusivement parmi les anciens soldats de l'armée et ses cadres étaient composés d'officiers. Cette organisation, dès le premier

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moment de sa formation, a tres justement decide de se borner exclusive-
ment au role de la resistance armee contre l'ennemi, en excluant de
son programme toute visee d'influence politique ulterieure sur le pays.
Au point de vue tendances, elle aussi est pour le regime republicain
et contre le retour du Roi, mais sous la condition que cette decision
soit prise par le peuple lui-meme s'exprimant librement apres la libera-
tion du pays. C'est surtout cette difference fondamentale qui, des le
commencement de 1943, dressa les deux organisations, l'EDES et l'EAM
l'une contre l'autre. L'EDES se considerait comme n'etant rien d'autre
qu'une armee de guerillas.

L'EAM, au contraire, etait un parti politique disposant de la
force armee d'ELAS comme organe, non seulement de resistance contre
l'ennemi, mais aussi d'influence et de pression sur la population
dans un but bien defini et d'apres un plan portant toutes les marques
des methodes communistes, visant a la conquete ulterieure du pouvoir
politique en Grece par les moyens de recrutement des masses par la
propagande, autant que possible, et de l'elimination de tous les ad-
versaires politiques au communisme marquants.

C'est ainsi que la guerre civile larvee se declancha en Grece
longtemps avant la liberation du pays. Des personnes ont ete tuees,
d'autres ont ete persecutees, des provinces ont ete terrorisees, et il
y a eu une campagne systematique contre les organisations anti-communistes
et contre tout citoyen qui n'etait pas d'accord avec les meneurs de
l'EAM.

En meme temps, vu que les communications avec l'Egypte etaient

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etablies, l'influence de l'EAM a commence a s'exercer aussi sur les forces armees grecques en cours d'organisation en Palestine, et sur le personnel de la flotte. D'apres la methode communiste bien connue, dans les diverses unites et batiments ont ete organises, petit a petit, des noyaux communistes qui, sous le couvert du patriotisme et des principes de la democratie, se rattachaient autour d'eux tous les soldats et les marins, en general anti-communistes, mais excites par les meneurs qui employaient les elements generalement hostiles au Roi George. Comme le gouvernement britannique ne cachait pas son desir obstine de voir le Roi rentrer en Grece apres la liberation, une conviction generale commencait a se former que finalement, sous le couvert d'une constitution soit disant democratique, elaboree par le gouvernement du Roi a Londres (comme le Premier Ministre Tsouderos l'avait lui-meme declare officiellement), une nouvelle dictature serait imposee au peuple grec, puisque les Anglais ne pouvaient pas ignorer qu'avec un plebiscite libre ils ne pouvaient avoir aucun espoir de voir reussir la politique tendant au retablissement du Roi.

Entretiens, les autorites britanniques du Moyen Orient se sont mises en liaison avec les diverses organisations de resistance et, pour les raisons que j'ai exposees, l'absence d'un plan d'action d'ensemble de la part de ces officiers de liaison, /a cause une confusion complete en ce qui concernait les veritables tendances, ainsi que le rendement reel des guerillas de ces organisations et de la situation generale en Grece.

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D'autre part, en accord avec les principes énoncés par M. Churchill, les Britanniques envoyaient des armes et des munitions à toutes les organisations et, naturellement, en beaucoup plus grande quantité à l'organisation ELAS-EAM qui était la plus forte et qui, de la sorte, se renforçait davantage que les autres.

Survint le revirement complet de la politique britannique, qui du jour au lendemain abandonnait Mihailovich jusqu'alors proclamé par Londres comme le chef de la résistance yougoslave. Tito apparaissait sur la scène de Yougoslavie, exactement trois mois après la signature à Londres, sous les auspices anglais, du traité d'alliance d'après guerre Grèce-Yougoslavie, nettement caractérisé par Moscou comme indésirable, ainsi que j'ai écrit plus haut. Tout naturellement, ce revirement de la politique anglaise en Yougoslavie vers les partisans de Tito et son mouvement nettement pro-communiste, a été un changement stimulant pour l'EAM et aussi le moyen le plus efficace pour la population d'être confondue et entraînée à la conviction que c'était surtout ce mouvement qui avait le soutien non seulement de la Russie Soviétique mais aussi des démocraties occidentales, étant donné qu'il est généralement connu qu'en ce qui concerne le pays balkanique, la politique britannique exprime aussi la politique américaine. En dernier lieu, les souffrances innées du peuple grec, tout naturellement, ont été utilisées par les communistes de l'EAM pour créer et alimenter un courant d'opinion de plus en plus à gauche.

La sont les facteurs de la confusion grecque qui font qu'une masse, absolument anti-communiste, a pu être rassemblée et cristallisée autour de la minorité très agissante, très compacte et très disciplinée

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du parti communiste, qui etait l'ame de l'EAM et composait les 3/4 de l'ELAS, organe militaire de l'EAM.

Le gouvernement britannique se reveilla finalement aux dangers crees par les erreurs de sa politique, lorsque les bandes armees des diverses organisations se sont mises a se battre l'une contre l'autre, et les atrocites de l'EAM-ELAS contre la population ont commence a prendre en certaines occasions des proportions qui ne pouvaient passer inaperçues. C'est alors que le gouvernement britannique, par des declarations publiques de MM. Churchill et Eden a la Chambre des Communes, a stigmatise cette attitude et pris diverses mesures tendant a assurer une espee de compromis entre les divers groupes combattant en Grece qui acceptaient d'etre places sous le commandement du General en Chef Allie au Moyen Orient.

Mais, en meme temps, la politique anglaise restait inbranlable en ce qui concerne la question royale, quoique M. Churchill ait affirme a la Chambre des Communes que l'EAM-ELAS developpait un esprit de combat contre les Grecs opposes a ses visees politiques plutot que contre l'envahisseur, M. Eden affirmait que la distribution des armes a toutes les organisations serait continuee, tandis que les services du Quartier General Britannique du Caire, tout en marquant une certaine preference pour l'organisation EDES, approvisionnaient pourtant aussi fortement l'organisation ELASKEAN. Ceci, malgre que cette derniere, meme apres la signature du compromis ci-dessus mentionne, se tournait a maintes reprises contre l'EDES et contre l'EKA, celle-ci, etant la moins forte, put etre eliminee completement par le massacre atroce de son chef, le Colonel Peares.

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La Formation en Grèce d'un Gouvernement Revolutionnaire:

Pendant l'automne de 1942 le Colonel Bakirdzis, représentant l'EAM, était arrive en Egypte. Pour des raisons que je n'ai jamais pu comprendre, le Colonel, au lieu d'être employé à un poste quelconque dans le service du gouvernement en exil, est demeuré pendant deux mois au Caire en toute liberté et avec toute facilité pour organiser des contacts, recruter l'armée, suggerer la formation parmi la population grecque d'Egypte d'organisations soi-disant anti-fascistes, mais en realité faisant fonction pour l'EAM d'organes de propagande parmi la population et les forces armées grecques en Egypte. Après quoi, le Colonel a été facilité par les Anglais et rentrait en Grèce. Immédiatement après son retour, l'EAM prit la décision d'attaquer ouvertement le gouvernement en exil, quoique celui-ci, après la réforme gouvernementale de mars 1943, dont j'ai déjà parlé, était devenu assez représentatif de l'opinion, étant donné que le portefeuille le plus important était attribué au parti politique republicain démocratique le plus puissant en Grèce, le Parti Liberal Venizeliste.

Vers le mois de juin 1943, quand les représentants politiques de l'EAM sont arrivés au Caire, ils ont exigé la prise en main du gouvernement, tout en disant officiellement qu'ils demandaient la composition d'un gouvernement d'union nationale représentant tous les partis, toutes les organisations et toutes les tendances d'opinions développées par l'occupation en Grèce, et naturellement, avant tout, l'EAM, laquelle prétendaient ils, représentait la majorité du pays.

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A cette occasion, les autorites britanniques se sont comportes d'une maniere inexplicable. Les representants de l'EAM ont ete mis sous la surveillance de la police et il a meme ete question de les exiler au Soudan ou ailleurs, (ce qui n'a pas ete fait), et finalement, apres le rejet pur et simple de leurs demandes, on leur a permis de rentrer en Grece. C'est alors qu'un de ces representants, M. Tsirimokos, a trouve le moyen d'expedier d'Egypte a M. Vlavianos, editeur du journal grec de New York "National Herald", une copie du long memorandum proclamant les desirats de l'EAM. C'est depuis ce moment qu'une propagande effrenee en faveur de l'EAM a ete declanchee aux Etats Unis d'Amerique par le "National Herald" et le journal grec hebdomadaire communiste "Tribune Greco-Americaine".

Les representants de l'EAM rentres en Grece, constituaient une espere de gouvernement denomme "Comite Politique" et compose de Colonel Bakirdzis, de deux communistes, anciens Deputes, et de deux ou trois autres personnalites, lesquelles etaient comprises pour donner le change, parce que quoique tres a gauche, ces hommes n'etaient pourtant pas communistes, avaient une reputation d'honnete, et avaient ete persecutes par la dictature royale de Metaxas, (tel, par exemple, le Professeur de Droit Constitutionnel a l'Universite d'Athenes, M. Skelos, qui a meme ete nomme President de ce Comite, quoique sa presidence ait ete plutot nominale qu'effective).

La constitution de ce Comite, aide par la propagande convenable, a cree en Egypte une situation tellement confuse et tendue que, tout naturellement, en decoulant la mutinerie des forces armees en Egypte,

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mutinerie lamentable a tous points de vue, provoquée exactement a la veille du depart des unites grecques pour l'Italie ou elles devaient prendre part a la bataille pour la liberation de Rome. Cette mutinerie, apres vingt jours, a ete supprimee de la maniere que l'on sait, avec comme resultat le renvoi, enfin, par le Roi du President du Conseil, M. Tsouderos, et la formation d'un gouvernement provisoire par le President du Conseil actuel, M. George Papandreou, qui justement alors s'etait evade de Grece avec d'autres personnalites politiques.

C'est alors que la decision a ete prise de convoquer au Moyen Orient les representants de tous les partis et de tous les groupes resistants de Grece. Lors de cette conference, M. Papandreou, avec un courage et une franchise remarquables, mais extremement impolitiques devant les representants de l'EAM-ELAS, a fait publiquement un eloge de leurs actions contre l'ennemi, eloge qui n'etait autre qu'une image terrible des actes de terreur de l'ELAS contre la populace et contre les personnes qui lui etaient politiquement opposees, ainsi que de ses exactions, sous forme d'impots et de requisitions imposees a une population sans defense sous le couvert de necessites militaires de la defense.

La preuve de la veracite de l'image presentee par M. Papandreou a ete donnee par les representants memes du parti communiste de l'EAM-ELAS, qui ont entendu ce requisitoire public sans pouvoir le demontrer.

A cette occasion, pourtant, il est a remarquer qu'il etait d'une logique tres discutable, d'une part d'accuser publiquement de

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pareils fofaits l'EAM-ELAS et le parti communiste, et, d'autre part, de proclamer aussi publiquement que pour assurer l'union nationale il fallait accepter la rentree au gouvernement des organisations accusees de ses forfaits, et meme avec des postes tres nombreux et tres importants. C'est pourtant exactement ce qu'a fait M. Papandreu, sous l'inspiration de la politique britannique.

Les representants de l'EAM-ELAS et du parti communiste ont bien voulu accepter ladite proposition et signer ce qu'on a appele le Contrat National Grec, mais des qu'ils sont rentres en Grece, ils ont change d'avis et pendant un mois refuse de faire honneur a leur signature, jusqu'au moment ou une mission militaire sovietique arriva au Quartier General de l'EAM en Grece. Et justement apres l'arrivee de cette mission, l'EAM-ELAS et le parti communiste on subitement change d'avis et accepte de faire partie d'un nouveau gouvernement auquel, effectivement, leurs representants ont participe. (Quatre pour l'EAM, deux pour le parti communiste).

Depuis, il a ete plusieurs fois affirme par les representants de la presse americaine, que c'est sur les conseils donnees aux dirigeants de l'EAM-ELAS par les Russes qu'ils ont accepte d'entrer au gouvernement. De toute facon, il n'est pas a douter que cette organisation, en maintes occasions, a eu le soutien, au moins indirect, de l'armee allemande de l'occupation. Ceci a ete affirme par des autorites grecques et par des autorites britanniques mais, en plus, il se confirme par le fait que tandis qu'il a ete extremement difficile pour des hommes en age d'etre militarises de s'enfuir de Grece vers le Moyen Orient, au contraire,

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les emissaires de l'EAM-ELAS pouvaient aller et venir comme ils voulaient, et il n'y a pas un seul cas d'aucun dirigeant de l'organisation ayant jamais été ou capture ou importune par les Allemands. Naturellement, les dirigeants de l'organisation EAM - parti communiste, refutent ce fait et ils prétendent avoir été les plus particulièrement éprouvés de la résistance, citant comme preuve de ces affirmations le fait que pas mal des membres de ce parti ont été fusillés par les autorités d'occupation.

Le fait est exact, mais pour juger sa propre valeur, il faut savoir ceci:

La dictature de Metaxas avait poursuivi le parti communiste. En même temps, elle poursuivait, avec la même rigueur, tous les éléments qui lui étaient politiquement hostiles et qui appartenaient, très naturellement, aux partis démocratiques libéraux. Parmi ces partis, le Parti Libéral Venizeliste, étant le plus fort, était l'objet d'une hostilité plus particulière de la part de la dictature. Pour justifier les arrestations et les deportations des libéraux et démocrates, la dictature de Metaxas les caractérisait tous de Venizelo-Communistes, en réservant la caractéristique communiste pour les membres enregistrés de ce dernier parti. Des fiches très minutieuses étaient constituées par les services de la Police Secrète de la dictature pour les personnes qu'elle caractérisait comme Venizelo-Communistes ou communistes. Pendant l'évacuation d'Athènes, le Ministre de Police de la dictature, Mantadakis, toujours en fonctions, avait pris soin d'ordonner que ces fiches ne soient pas détruites comme ont été détruits tous les autres documents de la Police Secrète relative aux services de contre-espionnage extérieur dont la police était chargée. Les Allemands, en entrant à Athènes, ont

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trouve ces fiches et en ont pris possession. Ainsi, environ deux mois après, quand l'Allemagne attaqua la Russie, les partis communistes dans le monde entier, qui avaient déclaré jusqu'à ce moment que la guerre subie par les démocraties était une guerre de la ploutocratie anglo-saxonne, subitement se raviserent en se rangeant pour la défense de la démocratie. Les Allemands, se basant sur les fiches de police de Maniatakis, ont fait des arrestations en masse des personnes indiquées sur ces fiches, tant communistes que libéraux, et démocrates qualifiés de Veniselo-Communistes, que j'ai déjà mentionnés. C'est parmi ces personnes qu'il y a eu des exécutions assez nombreuses, et ce sont ces victimes que les communistes invoquent pour prouver que le parti a été le plus éprouvé, quoique ces arrestations et ces exécutions ont eu lieu en majeure partie avant toute manifestation communiste de résistance contre l'ennemi. Du reste, la connivance indirecte des autorités d'occupation avec le parti EAM-ELAS, se manifeste plus tard par d'autres faits aussi significatifs.

Ainsi, après l'armistice italien, diverses unités italiennes ont préféré rendre leurs armes aux communistes. A maintes occasions, des officiers en tête des groupes de résistance opposés aux communistes, ont été mystérieusement dénoncés aux envahisseurs, après avoir refusé de se soumettre aux communistes de l'EAM-ELAS. Je peux citer deux cas officiellement constatés :

1. Le cas du Colonel Leonides Spahis.
2. Le cas du Colonel Stefan Sarafis, qui a été obligé, sous la menace de représailles contre sa famille, de prêter sa personnalité à l'EAM, qui l'a officiellement nommé commandant de l'armée du Parti, tout

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en reservant le commandement effectif de cette armee, exercee par des especes de commissaires communistes, nommes officiers.

En plus, il a ete constate durant la guerre civile actuelle en Grece, que parmi les troupes de l'EAM il se trouvait aussi des soldats, ^{qui} soit-disant communistes, /appartenaient a des puissances de l'Exe: des Allemands, des Italiens, des Bulgares, et meme des Roumains. Par ailleurs, la propagande allemande s'employa tres efficacement a dresser les groupes de guerillas les uns contre les autres, parce que ce conflit leur permettait de mener a bien leur but qui etait beaucoup moins d'ecraser le mouvement de resistance lui-meme, que de creer en Grece des conditions qui empecheraient tout retablissement de l'ordre au pays et, pourtant, creeraient les plus grande difficultes possibles aux Allies dans le cas et au moment ou les Allemands seraient obliges de se retirer. Ainsi, tantot ils favorisaient l'EAM-ELAS, tantot ils declanchaient a la radio des attaques contre le communisme, attaques, du reste, qui etaient employees en contre-coup par l'EAM, accusant tous ses opposants qui ne voulaient pas se soumettre a elle parce que sous la main des communistes, d'etre pro-Allemands, collaborationnistes et traitres, parce qu'ils adoptaient la propagande allemande, laquelle pourtant, sur ce point exclusivement, n'etait pas eloignee de la verite.

L'Ascendance Communiste

Je crois que dans ces conditions, il devient aise de comprendre pourquoi l'ascendance du parti communiste s'accentua et s'affirma continuellement. Il faut encore ajouter les causes supplementaires suivantes:

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1. L'EAM, sous l'inspiration communiste, a proclame des slogans tres democratiques relatifs a des ameliorations eventuelles sociales et economiques.

2. La population vivait des epreuves atroces, mourant de faim, sans vetements, avec un "black market" effrene.

3. Les chefs des partis politiques se sont confines a une resistance passive et, finalement, ils ont presque perdu contact avec les masses, lesquelles politiquement suivaient respectivement chaque parti.

4. Les refugies, surtout ceux installes autour d'Athenes, et autour du Piree, dans des localites tres peuplees, ont ete ceux qui souffraient le plus. Ainsi, tres naturellement et meme sans s'en apercevoir, ils ont ete petit a petit attirés par l'EAM vers le communisme.

5. La jeunesse, et surtout la jeunesse universitaire, naturellement plus genereuse, exalte par des sentiments patriotiques, a fini par subir elle aussi l'influence des slogans demagogiquement humanitaires des communistes, a un tel point que, finalement, une grande partie se constitua en formation speciale, a peu pres calquee sur la jeunesse hitlerienne allemande, et presque exclusivement communiste.

6. La defense victorieuse et les victoires qui ont suivies, de la part des Russes, victoires reellement aussi spectaculaires qu'elles etaient grandioses, survenues au moment ou la situation militaire generale des Allies semblait tres sombre, ont enflamme les coeurs en Grece, comme un peu partout dans le monde de sentiments de gratitude et d'admiration pour la Russie Sovietique. Cet etat d'esprit a ete tres habilement utilise par les communistes de l'EAM, qui sont arrives a canaliser cette

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admiration pour la Russie vers le système communiste, dont sont ainsi devenues des adeptes pas mal de personnes n'ayant auparavant pour les communistes que très peu d'enthousiasme.

7. Avant tout, les erreurs systématiques et opiniâtres de la politique anglaise, erreurs qui peuvent très sommairement être résumées comme suit:

a) Pendant le premier hiver de l'occupation, les souffrances causées par le manque de vivres ont été indiscutables. Des hommes mouraient de faim dans la rue. La mortalité infantile devenait effrayante. La misère qui tombait sur le peuple dépasse l'imagination. Dans des conditions pareilles, on a su que l'Angleterre n'acceptait pas de lever le blocus pour que le peuple puisse être approvisionné. Naturellement, le Cabinet britannique a fait tout ce qu'il a pu pour que cette question soit solutionnée le plus rapidement possible, mais la propagande allemande, et les insinuations communistes, troublaient les esprits et une certaine amertume contre la rigidité anglaise sur cette question subsista.

b) L'attitude du gouvernement britannique, s'opposant obstinément aux sentiments anti-royalistes et supportant, contre la volonté nationale, le Roi et le régime de Tsoouderos, indisposa les démocrates, c'est-à-dire l'immense majorité du pays, contre le gouvernement britannique, quoi qu'en même temps les sentiments de solidarité, de gratitude et d'admiration pour le peuple britannique aient été en général très intenses.

c) Les rapports du gouvernement britannique avec les partis politiques ont été systématiquement négligés et j'ai des raisons de croire que c'était là le résultat des suggestions de M. Tsoouderos, alors

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President du Conseil en exil a Londres, et du Roi lui-meme, qui voulaient exclure de toute influence les chefs des partis politiques qu'ils savaient contre le Roi et son regime. Mais ce manque de contact du gouvernement anglais avec les chefs des partis politiques a prive ces derniers de tous les moyens et appuis qui ^{leur} ~~lui~~ auraient ete absolument indispensables s'ils voulaient prendre la direction des mouvements de resistance, en sachant de quoi il s'agissait et ce qu'ils faisaient.

d) Les contacts des autorites anglaises, tant politiques que militaires en Moyen Orient, avec les groupes de resistance, ont ete caracterises par des inadvertances et des erreurs, dont j'ai deja mentionne les principales.

e) De plus, il parait, d'apres certaines informations digne de foi, que par suite de la situation generale et des evolutions du plan de guerre Allie, il y a eu en ce qui concerne les operations de liberation en Grece envisagees par les Anglais, un changement qui ne leur permit pas, quand arriva le moment de la liberation, de disposer des moyens militaires que comportait la politique poursuivie par eux en Grece pendant l'occupation, moyens dont ils comptaient pouvoir disposer au moment de la liberation. Ainsi, ils ont arrives encore une fois en Grece avec trop peu et trop tard.

Toutes ces causes ont fini par augmenter non seulement l'influence et la preponderance communiste de ~~l'ARMEE~~ ELAS, mais aussi la nombre des partisans convaincus du communisme a tel point, que je crois pouvoir dire, que les effectifs du parti communiste qui comptaient environ 10%

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des votants pendant les dernieres elections libres qui eurent lieu en Grece le 26 janvier 1936, doivent etre aujourd'hui de 25% - 30%. On vient de me signaler qu'une dame bien connue de la societe d'Athenes, epouse d'un professeur de Polytechnique, aristocrate et riche, est entraine vers le communisme a tel point qu'elle est devenue une des militantes la plus ardente du Parti. Je cite ce cas parmi plusieurs, a mon avis assez caracteristique de la situation generale.

Conclusions:

De cet expose, necessairement trop succinct et plutot incomplet, je crois que les conclusions suivantes decoulent:

I. En ce qui concerne les causes, il faut insister sur le manquement absolument errone de la situation de la part des Allies. Au lieu de placer en tete du mouvement de resistance et tous ses groupes, un officier superieur Allie, de preference Americain, ayant autour de lui un noyau d'etat major et des conseillers politiques nommes par les gouvernements Grec, Britannique et Americain, et charge de diriger absolument toutes les activites des groupes de resistance, tant militaires que diplomatiques, les Allies ont laisse virtuellement independants les groupes de resistance. D'autre part, on a suivi le principe de distribuer des armes a tous les groupes, sans distinction politique, pourvu qu'ils s'opposent aux Allemands. Mais les groupes restaient a peu pres libres de decider de l'utilite, de l'opportunite et des moyens de cette opposition.

L'EAM, domine par les communistes, utilisa cette liberte non seulement pour attaquer les Allemands, en quoi elle a fait oeuvre tres

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meritoire, mais aussi, et parfois même surtout, pour écraser ses adversaires politiques. Elle se désintéressa complètement de la situation de la population et de l'utilité réelle de son action dans le plan général de la guerre. Par exemple, elle s'attaqua à des petits détachements allemands, elle en tuait quelques-uns par-ci par-là, ce qui, pourtant, avait comme résultat final pour la guerre générale une contribution absolument négligeable, et pour la population, des représailles terribles, absolument disproportionnées avec les résultats guerriers obtenus. En même temps, l'EAM pour se ravitailler s'adressait naturellement aux paysans qui, bon gré, mal gré, se voyaient obligés de disposer du peu qu'ils avaient. S'ils ne le faisaient pas, l'EAM les traitait de traîtres. Quand ils le faisaient, et ils le faisaient toujours, les Allemands venaient le lendemain, brûlaient les villages et massacraient les villageois, sous le prétexte, du point de vue de l'ennemi très justifié, qu'ils ravitaillaient les mouvements de résistance.

De la sorte a été créée une situation qui ne pouvait pas durer, et la clameur générale de la population rurale a obligé le gouvernement d'Athènes à constituer ce qu'on a appelé les bataillons de sûreté. C'étaient des formations militaires destinées à défendre les villages contre le terrorisme de l'EAM. Naturellement, ces formations ont été favorisées par les Allemands. Mais il est absolument contraire à la vérité de traiter les individus appartenant à ces formations comme des collaborateurs, comme l'EAM le faisait pour la raison bien simple que ces formations contrecarraient ses projets et desseins. Le fait que

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le peuple Grec a accepte, et meme soutenu, ces bataillons, donne le dementi le plus irrefutable a ces accusations, vu qu'il est maintenant absolument et universellement connu et reconnu, que le peuple Grec, au moment de sa cruelle epreuve, n'a pas compose avec l'ennemi et n'a pas accepte quoi que ce soit qui puisse etre interprete comme un collaboration avec l'envahisseur. Le resultat de tout ceci a ete que l'EAM a fini par etre deteste de la population rurale, laquelle, il ne faut pas l'oublier, compose 67% de la population Grecque. La preuve que la population rurale et paysanne deteste l'EAM a ete faite a la liberation. Quand les Anglais ont débarque en Peloponese, pendant tout leur trajet a travers le pays rural jusqu'a Athenes, les impressions des representants de la presse americaine qui accompagnaient les troupes britanniques, ont ete unanimes en ce qui concerne les sentiments defavorables de la population rurale contre l'EAM. Naturellement, les impressions ont ete absolument contraires dans les grandes villes, et surtout a Athenes, parce que la il y avait le gros des militants communistes, et ce sont eux qui s'emparaient du pave, donnant ainsi l'impression d'un soutien populaire nombreux de l'EAM.

Il faut ajouter a tout cela, l'obstination anglaise en ce qui concerne la manipulation de la question politique. Au lieu d'exercer sur le Roi George la pression necessaire pour qu'il declare nettement qui ni lui ni son frere ne rentreraient en Grece avant le plebiscite, ils ont laisse trainer la question en donnant a une part de la population l'impression que reellement le gouvernement britannique pensait imposer

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le Roi d'une maniere ou d'une autre. D'autre part, les communistes de l'EAM utilisaient cette inquietude populaire comme slogan pour diffamer les adversaires comme royalistes et pour cultiver la suspicion contre l'Angleterre.

C'est dans ces conditions que les Anglais, arrivant en Grece par petits paquets, ont eu politique de dissoudre les bataillons de surete en laissant ainsi a l'EAM et a ses troupes, beaucoup plus nombreuses et disseminees dans tout le territoire, tous les moyens de leur assurer la main-mise sur le pays.

Le gouvernement grec, rentrant a Athenes, a commis la faute de suivre, vraisemblablement sur les suggestions anglaises, la meme politique de compromis continuelles envers les membres de l'EAM et du parti communiste qui occupaient les postes les plus importants dans le Cabinet. Les communistes, d'autre part, d'apres leur tactique bien connue et immuable, ont d'une part multiplie leurs exigences, en avançant de nouvelles apres chaque concession que leur faisait le gouvernement et, d'autre part, prepare leur mouvement definitif pour la conquete politique du pouvoir.

J'estime superflu de donner des details de l'evolution des choses jusqu'a la situation tragique ou elles ont degene. Le tres long communique officiel de l'Ambassade Grecque de Washington, en date du 11 decembre 1944, donne l'expose detaille et complet des faits.

Naturellement, les communistes qui, sans l'ombre d'un doute, ont prepare et declanche cette guerre civile, ont peut etre mal choisi leur moment, mais je crois qu'il est absolument certain qu'ils n'arriveraient

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pas a des decisions pareilles sans avoir reçu des encouragements de l'exterieur. Je ne crois pas, en effet, qu'il puisse servir a quoi que ce soit, de fermer les yeux devant la realite. La ou il y a contact, il y a friction. Et dans les Balkans, il y a certainement contact entre les interets vitaux britanniques imperialistes et Russes extensionnistes. Pour la Grande Bretagne, la Grece a une signification tres importante comme gardienne de la Mediterranee Orientale, vitale pour les lignes de communication de l'Empire. Pour la Russie, la Grece est un pays qui occupe tout le littoral nord de la mer Egee et qui s'oppose au debouche territorial du pan-slavisme dans les Balkans. La question Grecque n'est pas une question entre Grecs de diverses opinions. C'est une question entre Londres et Moscou. B'autant plus que partout les partis politiques communistes, soit disant nationaux, ne sont necessairement que des organes, de bonne foi si vous voulez, mais des organes toujours, de pression politique interieure favorisant la politique exterieure de la Russie Sovietique, mere spirituelle veneree de tous les communistes se respectant.

II. L'Intervention Anglaise:

En ce qui concerne l'intervention anglaise arsee, non seulement elle etait absolument justifiee, mais elle etait imposee par des raisons morales et politiques, grecques aussi bien que britanniques, et il est regrettable qu'il n'y ait pas eu, en meme temps, une intervention concertee americaine.

Il s'agit en Grece d'un mouvement revolutionnaire, tendant de conquerir le pouvoir politique sous pretexte qu'il represente l'opinion

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publique et parce qu'il dispose d'une armee, laquelle a ete approvisionnee en armes et munitions uniquement par les Allies. En face de lui, l'Etat ne dispose d'aucune force de resistance, ceci parce que la Grece a sacrifie toute son armee a combattre l'ennemi. Dans ces conditions, une obligation morale superieure existe pour les Allies d'aider l'Etat a se reconstituer, s'ils veulent reellement sauvegarder les principes democratiques et assurer au peuple grec la possibilite de se prononcer librement sur sa destinee. Si les Anglais agissaient autrement, ils seraient a juste titre accuses de laisser le peuple grec tomber sous la dictature d'un parti, auquel eux-memes ont prealablement donne des armes pour qu'il puisse s'imposer.

III. La Solution:

Aussi, si l'on veut reellement arriver a une solution democratique et definitive de la situation grecque, je crois qu'il conviendrait de faire ce qui suit:

- a) N'accepter aucun compromis avec l'EAM en ce qui concerne la disposition par elle d'une force militaire speciale.
- b) Discuter cette force militaire. Ceci, a mon avis, peut etre realise par des moyens adequats. En voici un: On pourrait publier une loi specifiant que les membres de la resistance, d'apres les services rendus pendant l'occupation et verifies selon une procedure etablie, auront droit a des honneurs specifiques et a des pensions definies, tandis que ceux d'entre eux qui le desirant et en sont reconnus capables, pourront servir dans l'armee apres instruction prealable.

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c) Accelerer le redressement economique et l'approvisionnement du pays.

d) Proceder immediatement a la reorganisation de l'armee, en prenant soin d'entraîner les recrues autant que possible dans des camps Allies, et utiliser cette armee sans delai la ou le Commandement Allie le jugerait necessaire.

e) Resoudre une fois pour toute la question politique. Personne n'a le droit d'exercer un changement de regime. Le regime doit rester tel qu'il etait jusqu'au plebiscite. Mais, d'autre part, d'apres la constitution en vigueur, une Vice-Royaute doit etre etablie a Athenes.

f) Proclamer comme existant le Parlement dissous par le Roi en violation de la Constitution, et de rappeler ce Parlement pour que le gouvernement puisse se presenter devant lui et obtenir un vote de confiance, lequel seul pourrait lui assurer la qualite d'autorite morale necessaire pour gouverner.

g) Faire constituer par ce Parlement un Corps Consultatif compose de representants des partis politiques, du Parlement et de l'EAM, apres quoi le Parlement serait dissous et le gouvernement gouvernerait avec ce Corps Consultatif.


h) Preparer le plebiscite qui doit decider par oui ou par non de la forme du regime, sous la reserve que si le peuple vote pour la Republique, la Constitution Republique de Grece legalement votee en 1927 et demeurée en vigueur jusqu'en 1937, quand la royauté a été rétablie, rentrera en vigueur. Dans le cas ou, au contraire, le plebiscite serait en faveur du Roi, la royauté serait ipso facto rétablie en même temps que la Constitution Royale de 1911, remise en vigueur en 1935 quand

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le Roi est rentre en Grece, avec, naturellement, l'abrogation pleine et entiere de tous les actes constitutionnels promulgués par le Roi pendant la periode de la dictature et de l'occupation allemande.

1) Preparer les elections generales qui composeront le premier Parlement apres la solution de la question du regime. Les elections ne devront a aucun prix avoir lieu d'apres le systeme proportionnel. Les politiciens insisteront avec acharnement pour que ce systeme proportionnel soit adopte. Ils ne devront pas etre ecoutes. Ils insisteront non parce qu'academiquement ce systeme est plus juste et plus representatif, mais parce qu'il favorise les ambitions personnelles, la formation de petits groupes politiques autonomes. C'est a dire, la fragmentation du Parlement, de telle sorte qu'il exclut presque mathematiquement la possibilite de formation d'un Cabinet suffisamment homogene, fort et durable, et ceci au moment meme ou le pays a, avant tout, besoin vital d'un Cabinet fort, homogene et durable.



Paul Moschovits

New York, le 15 decembre 1944


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- (f) ELAS GHC dare not order complete non-cooperation in Phase 3. But they will always continue to operate at a minimum and avoid casualties at all costs. Each commander has a complete and fairly ambitious operational plan, which has been agreed on prior with the rebel leaders. These commanders realize that only a proportion of their complete plan will be executed when it comes to the point; but at least it is an outline for the rebel leaders to absolutely nothing. In any case, the local military commander would like to do very much more. This helps us in dealing with the political commander. Some action. The plans for Phase 3 are important. The results to be achieved against any opposition from ELAS, short of an order to refuse all co-operation in Phase 3.

4. The above reasons satisfy me that we have good grounds for optimism that the results of Phase 3 in EAM/ELAS areas. The military situation justifies the decision not to end armed resistance to the Germans by withdrawing the Mission.

5. ZERVAS

- (a) In Dec 43 I reluctantly recommended, on solely military grounds, that the support given to ZERVAS should cease because he was unlikely to recover sufficiently to make it worth while. It was decided, however, not to act on this advice, and I have no hesitation in presuming that you are now satisfied that this decision was right. On personal grounds this has very much increased because I respect ZERVAS as a good soldier and a loyal ally, and the actions of his men, whose ranks have been reduced, but their efficiency improved by the civil war which was forced on them.

- (b) The effort to preserve ZERVAS' forces was an expensive one. Its justification must lie in military results, and it is important to be able to state these correctly. Two points should be noted.

(1) ZERVAS' forces were not only a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas, but also a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas.

(2) ZERVAS' forces were not only a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas, but also a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas.

ZERVAS' forces were not only a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas, but also a valuable asset in the EAM/ELAS areas.

The above reasons satisfy me that we have good grounds for optimism that the results of Phase 3 in EAM/ELAS areas.

(i) Although all types of weapons except the 105mm DIV are in the hands of the ELAS, some (81mm, 120mm) were sent to the army of the Greek army in the north, while the rest of the weapons in the army were sent to the ELAS. Also reported to have been sent to the ELAS (NORTHWEST THESALY), ELAS (CENTRAL THESALY), AYIOI VLASIS (WESTERN HELLAS). Other arms are in the hands of the ELAS. Most of the surrendered Italian artillery was taken off and probably very little ammunition remains in the north.

(ii) Other have been reported of weapons being abandoned in the hands of the army, both in the civil war and in German driven. At KALAMATA 7/1/43 on 8 Nov 43 I personally saw ELAS rebels trying to destroy stocks of weapons and ammunition with explosives.

(iii) Many weapons are wanted in the hands of women and children for military purposes. I give a few examples which say ALO (NORTHWEST THESALY) with many others. At PYDALOPON (WESTERN MACEDONIA, 7/1/43) on 22 Mar 44 (Independence Day) the ELAS sent a squad of about 10 fully equipped and armed fighters. I have no record of these ever taking part in any action. At MAVRELI (10 DIV HQ) on 12 Apr I watched POWER instruct a picked squad (picked by ELAS), two of whom were boys obviously under 18; when told to take up a firing position they had no idea what to do. About the same time WING saw POWER strip a LMG belonging to a rebel, who did not know the art of the firing mechanism was missing. Also ALO can confirm my impression that practically the only members of ELAS seen in a new B.D. are women, police, and office soldiers.

(iv) Stocks of weapons, especially sub-machine guns, pistols and hand grenades, have been made for some time in Athens and other towns. Most ELAS leaders no longer deny this when challenged.

(v) Stocks delivered to operational units for NOAH'S ARK continue to be transferred to non-operational units, especially of 10 DIV (PIRUS) and 13 DIV (KORNELI). ELAS leaders adamantly deny and justify this.

(vi) Wastage of ammunition occurs all over GREECE due to bad firing discipline. Many rebels open fire with sub-machine guns at 100 yards. Village-type rebels, especially those who have never been in action, let off fusillades of shots every time they get drunk. Shooting in the air is a traditional part of many celebrations, such as weddings and parties, and is common. The cumulative wastage is large.

(vii) From operations against RALLI and other GULLING troops cost much ammunition. We advise rebels not to take the initiative in such operations, but defend their areas when attacked. This advice is sometimes agreed, sometimes not, and never followed. We have pointed out often that such expenditure will not in our eyes be an excuse for requesting more ammunition without success.

(viii) From the above I draw the following conclusion: whether the supplies sent by us are in themselves adequate to build up the supplies for NOAH'S ARK, ELAS have no case for asking for more. They put their house in order. We have pointed out time and again that the proportion of the supplies needed for NOAH'S ARK is small. We have pointed out that the ELAS are not willing to do this. On 15 Jan 44, and on 15 May 44, we have pointed out that they contrive to buy the best the

they had never heard of it before. They have made no attempt whatever to carry out our proposals. They have rather dissipated our resources, and concentrated their own. In my judgement, their resources and ours combined would be enough for NOAH, and our policy should, therefore, not be changed until ELAS did conform with our wishes. Any weakness in this matter would only lead us deeper and deeper into valueless concessions.

- (d) The supply question in regard to ZIRVAT forces is different. This organization had little the situation in late talent for almost no existing supplies in kind. 4 of the abuses referred to above only could be charged in any degree to ZIRVAT forces at any time. Both are rapidly being eliminated by the increasing introduction of better officers. On the other hand, the generosity of ZIRVAT budgets seems to lead to some extravagance. There can be no doubt that this scale of supply is a whole inadequate for NOAH's and

ITALIAN POLITICAL

- (a) The Greek for these two words in the title. Otherwise I should not be making any remarks about the latter.

- (b) The Italian has been thoroughly tangled up in civilian affairs. Particularly through the maintenance of the Italian and civil relief, and in helping to support part of the mountain population. This means that we are also to some extent tangled up in local politics. We regret this, but we cannot help it. The success of the rebel movement is bound up with the support of the villages. If the villages were disloyal to the movement, it could not have made a successful start. It is now strong enough to coerce the villages instead of coaxing them, but it is still dependent on them, and although much coercion is used, the organization naturally prefers to keep the villagers sweet. Hence the efforts of EAM/ELAS to make up support the villages as well as themselves. A copy of ELAS HQC order E 11 750 of 7 Oct 43 on this subject was sent you on CLASHOUSE one. From their point of view, the result has been very good. In supporting many mountain villages in the form of Italian maintenance and civil relief. These are simply two ways of subsidizing the mountain villages and, therefore, indirectly the organization.

Italian Maintenance

- (a) I have always emphasized and told EAM/ELAS that we never officially accepted EAM/ELAS' repudiation of their written undertaking to support the planned 14,000 men of the 1st and 2nd in their own terms (ELAS 44 of 15 Oct 43, repudiated by ELAS HQC of 17 Oct 43). Originally sent to you by hand of ROBINSON. But we only undertook the humanitarian task of seeing that the Italians did not die as a result of EAM/ELAS' treachery and that only if they gave us full co-operation.
- (b) Therefore we have accepted no claim against us for repayment of what EAM/ELAS were able to provide toward 12,000 maintenance during time whether before or after the repudiation. Our position is that we will not recognize their repudiation or their motives and we will not recognize it at all unless they do all they can to help us. We had a hard struggle to get any help at all in the two important areas (WEST THRACIA and WEST MACEDONIA). By the end of Nov 43 we had succeeded in WEST THRACIA, but in WEST MACEDONIA the situation is still not satisfactory, though gradually improving.

(c) Two systems have been followed in looking after the Italians:

(i) Concentration in large camps, as was originally the practice in WEST THESSALY and still is in WEST MACEDONIA.

(ii) Dispersion in villages, where the Italians are billeted voluntarily on villagers, who feed them and use them as labourers. This system is now most efficiently operated in WEST THESSALY by WOKRALL.

(d) The cost of maintenance in both cases is about one third sov. per head per month. This is probably more than enough; otherwise the villagers would not have accepted it so readily. Even in WEST MACEDONIA the villagers are greatly in favour of system B, but ELAS refuse it, ostensibly on security grounds. It is hard to see why this system should operate in WEST MACEDONIA and not in WEST THESSALY. So probably the real reason is that the MACEDONIAN EAM/ELAS finds the concentration system more paying, perhaps in the form of a covert tax, and certainly at one time in the form of falsified nominal rolls.

(e) The dispersion system in WEST THESSALY brings the Mission some credit, and probably the organisation some profit. No system would work without this, because the organisation would not allow it to work. We have successfully eradicated a few cases of embezzlement and there is now no flagrant exploitation. On the whole I consider that the Italian problem has been satisfactorily settled. Our present expenditure is the price of the decision taken last Sept to get hold of the Italians and concentrate costs.

10. Civil Relief.

(a) This has been a disturbing problem for over a year and cannot be considered satisfactorily settled. Unless the Germans leave GREECE before next winter, I doubt whether we can continue to manage it.

(b) It is now taken for granted that the Greek population needs more help than the Germans allow the Red Cross to give them. One of the reasons for this is, in my opinion, that we have started civil relief in the first place, and thus encouraged the Germans to exploit our humanitarianism and force us to go on. It is only fair to add that this opinion is not shared by HAMMOND, who has more experience of civil relief than any other officer in GREECE.

11. In any case, it is now too late for us to give up the responsibility we have taken on. We have, therefore, the choice of the following policies:

(a) Infiltrating supplies in kind from the outside. This is obviously impracticable for the reasons given in your memorandum of Jan 22. It would also probably be unpopular with AWM, in breaking the blockade.

(b) Infiltrating gold to purchase food, etc. This could be handled by:

(i) The resistance organisations.

(ii) Representatives of UNICRA or similar organisations.

(iii) The Mission.

(c) Of these three alternatives, (i) has been rejected after trial, as it results only in corruption and incompetence; (ii) has been transiently advocated by Allen and myself; and (iii) is the choice which at present prevails.

[illegible][illegible]

(b) Civil Rights Work - The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been advised that the Bureau is currently conducting a study of the activities of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and its affiliates. The study is being conducted in order to determine the extent of the SCLC's activities and the impact of these activities on the civil rights movement. The study is being conducted by the Bureau of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the results of the study will be reported to the Department of Justice.

[illegible]

From the above, it will be seen that the
preparation of the report of the
committee on the subject of the
the above is in any way
to exactly what I believe to be the
nature of throwing the blame on us. The only
would give relief completely to the
to the reason for the problem.

Despite the above mentioned efforts of the U.S. to turn civil relief into a racket, they have not succeeded in not organizing the villagers against them, in fact to any considerable extent. Two in are often interviewed and they always utter, but I do not agree with these in all exposed by them. Also that the attacks are becoming genuinely heated. I believe the following points are important:

- [illegible]

(1) At present we meet only a small and unrepresentative group of the Greek press. A few who have never been to Greece, before knowing other Greeks like these. They therefore form the impression that all Greeks are thieves, beggars and anti-British.

[illegible]

(14) The first five of the factors listed in German law, as set forth in the proposed findings of fact, are limited to the following: (1) the fact that the defendant is a German citizen; (2) the fact that the defendant is a resident of Germany; (3) the fact that the defendant is a member of the German Air Force; (4) the fact that the defendant is a member of the German Air Force; and (5) the fact that the defendant is a member of the German Air Force.

11/11/1944

was shown by the AF report as follows:

[illegible]

(viii) KKK/NAACP: Identical to the KKK, a "meeting" is held with their victim. This is the "meeting" where the KKK/NAACP try to involve KKKs into their "Joint Committee" which are supposed to handle local problems. It is hard to induce KKKs who speak no other

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into making dangerous remarks. For this reason I categorically refused to allow the ELAS agreement to provide for the inclusion of an ELAS on even such committee, and laid down the principle that the rebels can settle their own grievances by themselves.

- (viii) It will be seen from the above that much of the ELAS task in dealing with EAM/ELAS consisted in evading traps. This is a very unfortunate situation which makes the word liaison a mockery. It is, however, without any doubt the result of bad faith on the part of EAM/ELAS, not of the Mission.

- (b) American relations are still ostensibly friendly. EAM/ELAS leaders have had it thoroughly rubbed into them by VINES that they cannot play off the Americans against the British. The tactics employed by them, especially by VASILIS SAMARINIOTIS (TZIMAS), were so naive that my opinion of their intelligence went down a long way. Similar tactics are still employed, but without conviction. The position now is that the organisation has abandoned its early confidence in the gullibility of American officers, but continue to be cautious towards them because almost every mountain village contains at least one Greek who has been to AMERICA, who carries some influence on local opinion and who usually regards EAM as the enemy of his hard-earned capital and property.
- (c) Russian relations are much advertised by EAM/ELAS though in a rather vague way, which confirms my impression that RUSSIA has shown much less interest in them than they would like. Last winter EAM/ELAS made a bad mistake in its treatment of escaped Russian POW, of which signed first hand accounts were sent to you by TRINKET 3. If we had been able to evacuate the Russians quickly their stories would have done great credit to the Mission and none at all to EAM/ELAS. Unfortunately their long wait for evacuation followed by the CONJUGAL catastrophe enabled EAM/ELAS to recover the lost ground. Despite all pretences, I have no doubt that the EAM/ELAS leaders regard RUSSIA as their first hope for the future and would be happy to let the Greek question be used as a wedge to split RUSSIA from BRITAIN and AMERICA.
- (d) Other nationalities in the Mission are regarded by EAM/ELAS with suspicion. We have had at various times a large number of nationalities under our command - Greek, Polish, Austrian, German, Italian, Czech, French, Egyptian, Persian, Jew and probably others. I consider it a matter of importance as well as a point of honour that, in whatever circumstances the Mission leaves GREECE, every person under its command, who wishes to do so, should leave with it. In the case of Greeks, failure to ensure this would endanger their lives.

Mission - Personal.

- (a) In the last year the Mission's way of life has radically changed. We are now an isolated foreign colony. We live to a greater extent like normal British units and consequently see less of the rebels and the villagers than we used to. Our standard of living is higher and more disproportionate to that of the Greeks than it used to be. This is sometimes embarrassing but it is hard to see what can be justly done about it. During the last six months expenditure on luxuries bought on the black market in occupied towns has been cut down, after having been at one time excessive. The standard of living at each station now depends on the area commander's conscience. Some stations lead a very Spartan existence and would regard the remarks as exaggerated. It would not help to point out to them that a member of HALLING I was living for a time on a standard lower than any station or any rebel unit ever reached, and know more or less what limits a station's standard should normally be kept within. My point is that it is unfair to let the whole question to the station commander's judgement. I have said that the matter be considered as a question of general policy.

which will probably affect other Balkan countries, if enemy occupation is likely to continue much longer. This is the most serious matter personally affecting the Mission which I have to raise. The following points are important but less urgent:

(1) Promotions and Awards.

I have raised these matters repeatedly in signals since assuming command. I shall say no more because I believe you now have the matter in hand and I do not wish it to be thought that members of the Mission are out to make a good thing for themselves out of their position. But as my recommendations have been delayed a very long time, and some (especially in the case of Greeks) have not been acknowledged, I think it is fair to remind you how isolated we are and how much it encourages all ranks and all nationalities to be confident that their interests are not being tied up in red tape and pigeon-holed for the duration.

(11) Correspondence and Comforts.

The same remarks apply, but I have no complaints to report, except from educated men and officers who have joined us in this country. Some of them feel that their personal interests are being looked after very slowly. I regard everyone under my command as being a Force 113 responsibility, wherever he comes from and however he got here.

(111) Relations with Greeks.

Most members of the Mission are on good terms with the Greeks, both inside and outside IAM/FLAS. Greeks of both sexes and of all ages have with very few exceptions never yet brought any serious complaints about the Mission. As long as relations are good, I do not consider it my business to verify how good they are. This does not mean, however, that I think the Mission would have an easy time if our official relations with IAM/FLAS again degenerated to the point reached last autumn. If our severed relations with IAM/FLAS would make very little head on the prospects of a total evacuation of the entire personnel of the Mission, and if it would be our duty to ensure, from IAM/FLAS territory,

American members of the Mission have been in the past though not in very large numbers nor with as much regularity as I should wish. I hope the following points will be borne in mind in consulting with you on their future share in the Mission:

- (a) British and American personnel should naturally work with each other under the same chain of command, the senior taking command irrespective of nationality. Since British and American ranks are levelled up (or down) to be comparable for with and assets to put American officers in positions of proper responsibility without removing experienced British officers to make way for American officers who are on a par junior to them. It came to be a fact, at one time in this country, that American officers given rank insignia and the expert advice of the British officer concerned. I know of no case in which this has caused any loss of credit, especially to the credit of the Americans.

not a good idea to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field.

(1) The first thing I did was to get a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field.

(2) The second thing I did was to get a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field.

(3) The third thing I did was to get a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field.

(4) The fourth thing I did was to get a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field. The only way to get a large number of people in the field is to have a large number of people in the field.

- 17 -

- (e) There seems to me, therefore, to be no ineradicable fault with the present system, though if the occupation continues indefinitely it ought to develop into a bigger share for the Americans.

20. ISLD.

I am grateful for the decision to send in British officers to control Greek ISLD agents. This will help to remove a long-standing abuse.

21. Interpreters.

I am most anxious to stress the great services rendered by the Greek interpreters who have joined the Mission from ATHENS and elsewhere. I have made a number of recommendations for recognition of their services, which I hope are under consideration. At each HQ station it is usually the senior interpreter who acts as treasurer, quartermaster and adjutant. They carry out this work at the risk of their lives, equally from the Germans and from EAM/ELAS. Their experience of their own people is worth many times their salary to the Mission. I consider that we are in honour bound not only to protect them now but to do everything possible to secure their position in GREECE after the liberation.

22. Conclusion.

I hope the foregoing picture of the Mission will convince you that all is well internally under remarkably odd conditions. I have never yet visited an unhappy station, nor one which I was glad to leave.

POSTSCRIPT.

- (a) In this report I have tried to confine myself entirely to facts. I have only made comments when I felt on secure ground and I have made those comments entirely from the point of view of the present military situation.
- (b) Greek matters can always be looked at from conflicting points of view: from the view-points of the present and the future, from the view-points of the soldier and the politician. We tend to distinguish these view-points, as I have done above; but Greeks never distinguish them and do not see how they can be distinguished.
- (c) In combining all the different view-points, sincere and honest Greeks reach very different conclusions according to the preponderance of one view-point or another in their train of thought. They cannot agree with us that the Greek question may have different answers from different view-points; that, for instance, EAM/ELAS may be right from the view-point of the present and wrong from the view-point of the future; or right politically and wrong militarily.
- (d) It is, however, my duty to point out firstly that I think this to be the cause of disagreement between honest men on straightforward questions; and secondly that I would not wish this report to be read from any other view-point than that from which I have written it, as defined in para (a) above.

In other words, this report should not be taken as expressing or implying any opinion, one way or another about the political future of GREECE. It concerns only the military present and stops short with the end of phrase of NOAH'S ARK.

20 May 44

Sgd CHAIRS
Col

001 Form 101

Date 21 Jun 44

To: Original Bureau

Very interesting report, containing
one excellent bit of unconscious
information:

"Most of the Andartes do not have
arms and many go around barefooted."

RT
EE

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : M. B. Wolf, Labor Section, SI

SUBJECT: Paricles Mission

DATE: 10 June 1944

SECRET

Upon his departure, Major Goldberg left instructions that you had specifically requested him to keep you informed concerning the progress of the Paricles Mission. Accordingly, I am attaching hereto a copy of our Letter #1 from Greece. I am also attaching an envelope containing pictures of a typical group of Andartes, showing the types of weapons used by them.

W.B.W.

MBW:cc

file

002

JUN 10 1944

RECEIVED

99

The Director

19 June 1946

Mr. M. Wolf, Labor Section, NY

Re: Mexico

On the departure, Major Goldberg left instructions

officially requested him to be

in the case of the

to be

to be

Very truly yours,

WJG

WJG

6 030-001

JUN 12 1944

Kubek, May 1, 1944

Dear Mr. [unclear]

We are in Greece at last. We came at a little past two nights ago and met with a royal reception on the part of the Andartes. These people mean business, and they are doing a wonderful job. They are young men from the surrounding villages, and the population seems to like them very much.

The trip from Smyrna was the most difficult part of the whole journey. It started more than a week ago, and had to turn back three times before making port. The weather was bad and the cargo small.

I sent you a cable this morning. Alex had no difficulty in getting there right away. George just sent me a note from Regiment HQ - saying that he is proceeding further north on the island in order to meet the order of the Andartes here who happened to be a personal friend of his. The other two of us will go to meet him in a few hours.

The people here are very good to us. They are trying to help us in every way. They place us in the best of quarters. They are trying to do the best with very little. They live badly, but little and don't have enough food - our people cannot have more than two or twenty pounds of ammunition. None of the Andartes at all have arms, and many go without food. It seems as if we had to think that it would be a great deal of trouble to get the Andartes to fight, while over here they will not fight at all and we are waiting. The head of the little port

- 4 -

at this port lent his pistol with twenty rounds of ammunition to a guard that went with a convey of mules to the regiment HQ. But, the second in command of the regiment was in need of weapons and kept the pistol for himself. Stories of this type are everyday happenings and show the lack of arms and ammunition.

During the last month Rubia was full of Germans and members of the Spelling Security Battalions that Premier Rullis created. It seems that they did plenty of dirty work over here, killings of hundreds of people, raping women and burning villages in the order of the day. The Andartes regiment here had plenty of men but for lack of ammunition and heavy arms could do little to stop them. Whatever the Andartes did, they did it with ambushing, and with isolated smaller groups. However, lately the Andartes have decided to clear the island from the enemy and they are organizing for large scale operations. They are pretty sure that they will be able to clean the island. The only thing, the Andartes ask for is arms and ammunition. The Germans don't have big forces in Greece, and the Andartes feel sure that if they get some help from the Allies they will be able to throw the Germans out of Greece. These boys are really tough and fearless, and it is not difficult to believe this boast. (Just now ten new came from battalion A, eight hours away, the two of them are here). - I am including two copies of the last monthly paper published in Rubia, there you will get plenty of information on the activities of the Security Battalions here. Give Nick one of the papers please.

Yesterday, they had elections here. The HAM also at creating a constitutional government. When the deputies are elected they will have

- 3 -

a constitution somewhere in Free Greece and will form a new government there. There is already in existence a government here under the presidency of Colonel Bakirtzis. Yesterday, I happened to be at a village over here and it was interesting to hear the representatives of the Anartes tell the villagers that they would elect any person they want whatever their political beliefs excepting "collaborators".

Another interesting thing that struck me when I saw us this year was the use of money is put to - instead of toilet paper the Anartes use money bills of 100 drachmas - (pre-war value of hundred drachmas was one U. S. dollar). The price of gold according to latest information is now from 40 - 50 million drachmas. People around here do not use money as a means of exchange. The barter system is in vogue now. Those who have dry goods to sell, they exchange them with some other goods. If they do not have any goods to exchange, they starve.

This is the first letter from Greece, but I will try to send you as much mail as possible. I am arranging here for good communication. The Anartes here are willing to help me as much as possible; the speed with which it will reach you will depend on our unique communication. I will also send you as much cabled intelligence as possible.

I hope that your work there is proceeding ok. The way things look to me from now, we shall need men soon. Especially the radio technicians. As I thought here we can get plenty of radio men here. The radio technicians are one of the main supporters of the Anartes.

I am enclosing a note from Athens to Nick. Please give it to him and get it from him. Also tell him that the head of the part of the Anartes who are in the old part of the town from the Spanish war.

- 4 -

He is Emilio MESSADAKOS, a former ship engineer. He sends his regards to him, and said that if Nick needs any men from here he can send as many as he wants. This man is very helpful to us, and possibly will be more so in the future.

Tell Young that the Andartes here are very thankful for whatever help he sends them. They are especially enthusiastic about the Tommy guns, but they are in such need for ammunition that they prefer to receive rifle bullets rather than rifles. They like both, of course, but the need for bullets is great! (9 mm ammunition is very difficult to get from the Germans because only the SS troops carry automatic weapons. They need other mechanisms that will fire land mines in number all at the same time. They sabotage the roads over here so that the enemy cannot get in and out easily. But, they like to blow a long part of the road at one time so that they can get large parts of convoys.

Now, I will send an undeveloped film of the life of the Andartes. Please develop them and make wide use of them. Send them to the Bureau as soon as possible.

Tell Young also that the Andartes have large numbers of Italian rifles and some light machine guns, but they are badly in need of ammunition for both. If he can send any they will be very thankful.

At all times, if possible, there is Italian ammunition available. Also, that the British send a few things to the Andartes in spite of their complaints. Tell us that his orders are to help the British as much as possible. Some of their agents here are doing some bad things. (British agents are refugees of their nation.)

- 4 -

and other propositions and instead of leaving it with the Amarrs who are badly in need of it, they sell it themselves and pocket the money.

Excuse the bad writing and any repetitions in this letter. It is written on my knee with about twenty people around me with many interruptions.

Alma and George send their greetings to you.

Please inform my friends that I am ok. Will try to see them some time later.

By the way the Amarrs that I met here do not like Pagandrac, the new Greek premier. They say that he was (with Genatas) the secret adviser of premier, Kallis and one of the organizers of the Security Battalions. We listened to his broadcast last night and the Amarrs here did not like his remarks about the Amarrs and the EAM, also his criticism of the destructive and fruitless work of the Security Battalions.

I have to stop here, because we have to move.

With best regards,

COPIA

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
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
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





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See Donovan's file. QAB.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES *ce*

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 18 May 1944

TO: Colonel Buxton

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Letter No. 10 from Mr. Penrose

14.322
Greece.
x Personalities
x Political parties

In accordance with Mr. Penrose's request, I am
sending herewith a copy of his letter No. 10, dated 11 May
1944.

W.H.S.
W.H.S.

TOP SECRET

Letter Is. 10

11 May 1944

Dear Whitney:

Attached hereto are three copies of a memorandum dealing with the current situation in Greece. May I ask you to have one copy delivered to General Donovan and one to Mr. Scribner. It seems to me that there should be any further distribution without your positive consideration.

There have been so many cabled and written reports dealing with the situation in Greece in recent weeks that it seemed wise to Lt. Commander Hiner and myself, with the concurrence of Lt. Colonel West and Lt. Wood, to send you a summary of the situation which will present developments in such a light as to show a rather complete picture. It seemed to us essential that Washington should understand the situation with which we are working and the obvious policies of our Allies with which we have to deal.

The information contained in the memorandum comes from both G2 and G3 sources and the memorandum itself represents a collaboration on the part of Lt. Wood, Mr. Yering, and Lt. Commander Hiner. It has been approved by Lt. Colonel West, who has also approved the forwarding of it in this form to Washington.

The original intention was to cable a summary, but I felt very strongly that this was unwise in view of the possible wide dissemination of the message and the fact that the same comments upon the actions of our Allies. Strictly speaking, we may be subject to criticism for forwarding that type of information, but it seemed to me that Washington should know the current situation in the Balkans.

If other recs of this memorandum reference needs to be made in the future, it can be referred to simply by the number of this letter. The reference will be understood by all concerned.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Stephen H. L. Parsons, Jr.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

20 May 1944

SUBJECT: Summary of the Current Situation within Greece, with Special Reference to the Continuing Strife between the Government and the Resistance Movement.

I.

1. Reference is made to Memo (date 20 May), addressed to the President of the United States, regarding the general deterioration of the situation within Greece.

2. The following is a brief summary of a series of signals received from the Greek Government and the American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, concerning the situation in Greece. This summary is based on the information received from the American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944. The American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944.

3. It is noted that the American Liaison Mission in Athens reported the failure of the Greek Government to provide the necessary information to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, regarding the situation in Greece. The American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944.

4. It is noted that the American Liaison Mission in Athens reported the failure of the Greek Government to provide the necessary information to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, regarding the situation in Greece. The American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944.

5. It is noted that the American Liaison Mission in Athens reported the failure of the Greek Government to provide the necessary information to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, regarding the situation in Greece. The American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944.

6. It is noted that the American Liaison Mission in Athens reported the failure of the Greek Government to provide the necessary information to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, regarding the situation in Greece. The American Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944, and the British Liaison Mission in Athens, dated 11 May 1944, have been forwarded to the President of the United States, dated 10 May 1944.

TOP SECRET

National Government of Greece.

The British Mission Officers told the EOKA representatives that they had an extremely grave view of the recent attack on Greece, and that it was a far more serious affair than other cases of EOKA's law. Despatches (EOKA representatives) stated our knowledge of aggressive acts on the part of EOKA and others that it is always being falsely accused of aggression. However, EOKA's equally attacked that the attack on Greece had been carried out by EOKA headquarters.

The British Mission Officers reports that he has been doing some preliminary to prove that does (the general's leader who claims allegiance to EOKA) ordered the recent slaughter of the British EOKA, including Greece.

At a meeting held on 8 May at 1700, 1715 in Cairo, General ... the ... of the EOKA ... to agree to ... the withdrawal of the EOKA 1st Regiment from ... which has almost the only ... by which ... to the EOKA for ... and in pursuance of this agreement ... of a signal to his ... to EOKA. This ... in Cairo on 8 May on ... in the ... being held at Beirut, there is representation EOKA. For ... in considering the future of the Beirut conference and the possibility of attendance, see our report (S-2197).

II.

At the ... should be considered in the light of ... that the main British policy towards Greece ... of influence, and that a Greece dominated ... It is entirely ... by that ... and feared ... of ... and because of ... and militarily. ... is currently receiving ... that such would ... the arrival of ... of the present ... all ... in the ... of the ... to ... the ...

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET9/22/22
Political/Pir

ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATIONSubject: Proposed Allied Action
against HAM-ELASOriginator _____
Date _____
Addressee _____
Date Rec'd _____

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
Secretariat		4/27/22	4/27/22	SMQD.	
Lt. Putzell				WJP	
Gen. Donovan				WJP	

TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES


14, 322
Greece -
Personal
Pot per
TOP SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT: Proposed Allied Action Against EAM-ELAS

DATE: 10 May 1944

I am sending you herewith a "TOP SECRET" item on the Greek situation which has just come in from our Cairo office. Attached thereto is a memorandum dealing with the subject prepared this morning by our Balkan section. In view of the possibility that ultimately disastrous decisions may be made, it seemed to me that you should be informed at once.


William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

attachments (2)

REF ID: A66666

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH
OFFICE OF SECRETARY SERVICES
U.S. ARMY PLANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

May 1947

To : Dr. William L. Langer
Att: Robert Wolff

From : Major Edmund

Subject : Speedy Action Against KAM-ELAS

The following paragraphs have been extracted from Lt. Nelson's report "Retrospect of the Greek Political Situation" (incorporated into Greek Intelligence Summary no. 11) as being operational rather than theoretical in character. Their substance requires that they be summarized, and they are accordingly submitted separately:

Evacuation, however, is not a policy, and the major problem for the Allies in Greece continues to be relations with KAM-ELAS. To allow the liquidation of KAM-ELAS by force without taking more effective action than mere protest will continually weaken the prestige of the British. But at the present moment it is not physically possible for the Allies in Greece to take effective action; to attempt to do so might well result in the loss of Allied officers and other personnel. The head of the British Military Mission in Greece, whose views are shared by the senior American officer present, believes that there are only two possible courses of action: (1) to withdraw all supplies and support from KAM-ELAS and to build up a force from KAM-ELAS itself to maintain it elsewhere (e.g., with Forces). This is regarded as inadvisable. (2) to infiltrate into Greece a heavily armed force of about 3,000 Allied troops, the equivalent of the brigade. When this force arrives, the Allied military representatives will demand that KAM-ELAS be withdrawn from the area, if this is not complied with the Allied force will seize Area by force and if necessary will destroy KAM-ELAS. This is regarded by the military as the most effective and the most certain course to be followed at the present time.

The military believes that the British and the Allied forces should be prepared to take action at the point where KAM-ELAS is most vulnerable, and that the most effective action should be taken at the point where KAM-ELAS is most vulnerable. This is regarded by the military as the most effective and the most certain course to be followed at the present time.

SECRET

e 2 -

action would be on the relations between Greece and the allies, how valuable it would be as material for their political warfare and that unpredictable results it might have on the whole allied political and diplomatic positions.

Unpredictable is a very wild term. Overt action against the Greek side of the action would be catastrophic. "AM" is the Greek resistance in Greece and has been vigorously fighting the Germans. Military action against AM would only strengthen the Greek resistance, within Greece and without, that the Allies are expected to proceed with the Germans to fight Russia. Greece was in a better position for that struggle.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TOP SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Dr. W. L. Langer
 FROM: Robert L. Wolff *RLW.*
 SUBJECT: Proposed Allied Action against the EAM - ELAS.

DATE: 10 May 1944

- 1) It is reported from Cairo that the head of the British military mission to Greece, whose views are shared by the senior American officer, proposes to infiltrate into Greece a heavily armed force of about 3,000 Allied troops, the equivalent of a brigade. This force would be used
 - a) to back up a demand by the Allied military representatives that the EAM - ELAS hand over the head of EAM, Aras, (Athanasios Klaras);
 - b) if this demand is not met, to seize him by force and if necessary take over ELAS HQ.
- 2) This proposal has grown out of the increasingly bad relations between the British and the EAM - ELAS. A truce was signed by the EAM - ELAS, the EDES, and the EKKKA on 29 February, with the understanding that Prime Minister Tsouderos would shortly broaden the base of the Cairo government by adding to it representatives of the guerrillas. This he failed to do; and his failure not only produced the present crisis and mutiny in Egypt, but has increased the restiveness of the guerrillas in Greece.

On 17 April ELAS forces under Aras attacked and disbanded a regiment of the EKKKA at Kifissia, killing Colonel Pсарros, commander of the EKKKA. EAM - ELAS had accused the EKKKA of collaboration, in violation of the truce, with the German-sponsored quisling government's Security Battalions. Upon the EKKKA's rejection of terms proposed by the EAM, it was then attacked and virtually liquidated.
- 3) The liquidation of EKKKA (approximately 1,500 armed men) is regarded by the chief of the British Military mission as a blow to British prestige which must not be allowed to pass unchallenged. He does not feel that the withdrawal of supplies, support, and liaison from ELAS will prove an adequate counter-measure.

TOP SECRET

To Dr. Langer - from RLW - 10 May 1944 - p.2

TOP SECRET

4) It is believed that the overt action against the EAM - ELAS proposed by the chief of the British military mission would prove little short of catastrophic to the Allies. The following are the reasons for this view:

- a) There is little doubt that EAM - ELAS would resist the Allied demands, and would fight. From a military standpoint the ensuing operation would prove difficult. Three thousand Allied troops armed with tanks and supported by planes might be able in time to liquidate resistance, but this is doubtful. EAM - ELAS has perhaps 30,000 men under arms; the Germans, with 40,000 to 50,000 troops now in Greece and at one time with seven or eight divisions, have never been able to subdue them or to control the areas of the country in which they operate. The terrain is highly favorable to trained guerrilla forces resisting heavily armed troops.
- b) Any such action would put an end to armed Greek resistance to the Germans, now being carried on most effectively, if not exclusively, by the EAM - ELAS.
- c) Such action would prove of great value to German political warfare, as follows:
 - i. It would serve as convincing proof of the German contention that the Allies are the real enemies of Greece. It would strengthen, and perhaps permanently crystallize Greek anti-British sentiment, which is at present based on the conviction that the British wish to force King George on Greece.
 - ii. It would be used to support the Axis-inspired rumor that the Allies had reached an agreement with the Germans to fight Russia, and that Greece was to become one of the battlegrounds in that struggle. The spectacle of Allied troops, in their first appearance in occupied Europe (Italy, of course, was a German ally), fighting not the Germans but the native inhabitants of the country could be successfully exploited by the enemy all over Europe, and probably in the Far East as well.

TOP SECRET